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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of the consequences of economic
development on the occupational choice of agents and its effects on macroeconomic
variables, such as structural change and income inequality. The interplay between
different types of agents is at the center of my research, both when it comes to matching
between agents and sorting from agents to sectors.
The first chapter focuses on the role of financial development for structural change.
When credit constrained, more talented agents sort into more labor-intensive sectors
than less talented agents. When borrowing becomes more available, talented agents sort
into capital-intensive sectors to optimally leverage their talent. Consequently, the capital
rental rates rise and less talented agents sort into labor-intensive sectors. Thus, financial
development reverses the sorting pattern. Furthermore, simulation results indicate that
employment shares increase in relatively labor-intensive sectors. I show that the empirical
data is consistent with these theoretical findings.
In the second chapter, I analyze the consequences of cooperation on inequality. I
develop a heterogeneous agents model of cooperation distinguishing between two types
of cooperation, between-task and within-task cooperation. The former is the opportunity
to assign different tasks to different agents. The latter is the reassignment of tasks from
one agent to another in cases where the first agent fails. Cooperation increases inequality
at the top and decreases inequality at the bottom. Within-task cooperation is more
inequality-enhancing than between-task cooperation. I also show that cooperation can
lead to a greater skill premium in economies with a more dispersed talent distribution.
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Preface
This thesis consists of two papers that develop occupational choice models of heterogeneous
agents to study the consequences of development on economic outcomes. The consequences
of certain economic developments (financial development, technological progress) on
occupational choice of heterogeneous agents are analyzed together with the effects on
macroeconomic variables, such as structural change, income inequality and poverty. A lot
of economic issues cannot be sufficiently well explained deploying canonical homogeneous
agents models. In particular, the interaction between agents - either directly within a
firm or via the labor market or indirectly via the demand for different goods/sectors -
demands matching models in order to analyze in depth the consequences of exogenous
change (e.g. technical progress, changes in policies or institutions) on macroeconomic
outcomes. The interplay of agents’ occupational choice and the supply and demand for
different types of agents on the labor market, and its consequences for economic outcomes,
can only be fully understand using heterogeneous agents models. Matching between
agents and agents’ sorting to different sectors stands at the center of my research.
In the first chapter, I develop a theory of structural change associated with financial
development. More specifically, I build a heterogeneous agents model of sectoral choice
with financial constraints. In equilibrium, when credit constrained, highly talented
agents sort into labor-intensive sectors and less talented agents sort into more capital-
intensive sectors. Negative assortative matching (NAM) prevails between agents’ talent
and sectoral capital intensity. By contrast, when borrowing becomes more available,
highly talented agents sort into more capital-intensive sectors to optimally leverage their
vii
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talent. Thus, among unconstrained agents positive assortative matching (PAM) prevails
between agents’ talent and sectoral capital intensity. The equilibrium sorting reverses
under financial constraints. As a consequence of financial development, i.e. less tight
borrowing constraints, the capital rental rates rise and low talented agents sort into
more labor-intensive sectors. Simulation results indicate that employment shares increase
in relatively labor-intensive sectors. Using a two-step strategy, I find that financial
development induces an increase in the alignment of the sectoral capital intensity with
the average sectoral wage, consistent with my model. Simultaneously, it leads to a
decrease in the alignment of sectoral capital intensity with sectoral employment shares.
Both effects are not only statistically but also economically significant.
The second chapter analysis the consequences of cooperation among agents on income
inequality. The historic increase in the amount of agents engaged in the production of
any good is indisputable. In order to analyze its consequences, I develop a heterogeneous
agents model of cooperation distinguishing between two types of cooperation, between-
task and within-task cooperation. The former reflects the possibility to share the overall
workload into different tasks and assign those to different agents. The latter represents
the reassignment of tasks from one agent to another in case of failure of the first agent. I
restrict attention to a particular, tractable information structure that yet allows both
types of cooperation to occur in equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is characterized,
particularly the equilibrium sorting of agents into modes of cooperation and matching
between agents. Cooperation leads to increasing inequality at the top and decreasing
inequality at the bottom of the talent distribution. Within-task cooperation is more
inequality-enhancing than between-task cooperation. This may help explain evolutions
in income inequality in response to the information and communication technology
revolution in recent years. Finally, I study how the information structure and talent
distribution shape the returns to talent in an economy. Particularly, both a wider talent
distribution and a better information structure are likely to increase the skill-premium.
This sheds some light on potential differences in the skill-premium across countries, for
example the United States and continental Europe.
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Chapter 1
Financial Development and Sorting
Reversals -
A Theory of Structural Change
In this paper I develop a theory of structural change associated with financial development.
When credit constrained, high-skilled agents sort into more labor-intensive sectors than
less talented agents. When borrowing becomes more available, highly talented agents sort
into more capital-intensive sectors in order to optimally lever their talent. Consequently,
capital rental rates rise and low-skilled agents sort into labor-intensive sectors. Financial
development reverses the sorting pattern. Furthermore, simulation results indicate that
employment shares increase in relatively labor-intensive sectors. Using a two-step strategy,
I find that financial development induces an increase in the alignment of sectoral capital
intensity with average sectoral wage and to a decrease in the alignment of sectoral capital
intensity with sectoral employment shares, consistent with my model. Both effects are
not only statistically but also economically significant.
Keywords: Financial Development, Structural Change, Occupational Choice, Sort-
ing Reversals.
JEL Classification Number: O10, J24, L16, E44.
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1.1 Introduction
An empirical phenomenon associated with development is structural change, that is, shifts
in sectoral employment shares. In the literature, structural change is mainly interpreted
as a consequence of non-homothetic preferences or heterogeneous technological growth
rates across sectors.1 Both theories try to explain the observed structural employment
shifts during growth. Yet they are silent on changes in workforce composition within
sectors over time.
Figures 1.1 and 1.1 indicate that this may be an important omission. They hint at
differences in the sectoral allocation of labor that depend on the level of development in
a country. Both figures consider how strongly sectoral wages are aligned with sectoral
wages in the United States. Specifically, sectors within countries are ranked according to
their average wage. The correlation of this ranking between a pair of countries is then
labeled the sectoral wage alignment. Figure 1.1 shows that sectoral wage alignment with
the United States is significantly higher for other developed countries compared to less
developed countries. If average wages are a good proxy for average sectoral talent (see
Abowd et al. (1999)), then this proxy suggests different sorting patterns for the agents
into sectors across different stages of development. Figure 1.1 complements that view by
indicating that this phenomenon is related to growth. It shows that the sectoral wage
alignment between the United States and South Korea increased during a period of very
high growth in South Korea.
I develop a theory of structural change that generates both employment shifts and
changes in workforce composition within sectors over time. The driving force behind
both individual sorting and the observed macroeconomic structural change is financial
development.2 As the financial system improves, the sectoral composition of agents
1Kongsamut et al. (2001) are an example of the former explanation for structural change and Ngai
and Pissarides (2007) are an example of the latter. The distinction between these types of theories is
between demand-side and supply-side-driven structural change.
2The importance of financial development for growth is well documented. See Levine (1997) for a
review of the literature.
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Figure 1.1: Sectoral Wage Alignment of Economies with the United States in 2000 (taken
from Sampson (2011))
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Figure 1.2: Sectoral Wage Alignment between United States and South Korea over time
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changes both across and within sectors. In other words, both the number of agents and
what type of agent sort into a sector depends on the level of financial development.
More specifically, I develop an occupational choice model of heterogeneous agents
with financial constraints. Agents differ in their levels of talent, and sectors differ in
capital productivity. In equilibrium, the sorting pattern depends on whether or not
agents are financially constrained. In particular, in the set of constrained agents, the more
talented ones sort into less capital productive sectors because they are less constrained
in sectors where the optimal capital-labor ratio is smaller. This sorting implies that
negative assortative matching (NAM) prevails for constrained agents between their talent
and sectoral capital intensity. Hence, earnings are higher in labor-intensive sectors.
By contrast, for unconstrained agents, the optimal capital-labor ratio increases in
talent. This implies that more talented agents sort into more capital-intensive sectors
where they can obtain optimal leverage for their higher level of talent. Thus, positive
assortative matching (PAM) prevails for the set of unconstrained agents, and the observed
earnings are higher in capital-intensive sectors.
In equilibrium, the economy is partitioned into two convex sets. All agents below a
certain cut-off level of ability are unconstrained, and PAM applies within that set. In turn,
the set composed of all agents above the cut-off level of ability is characterized by NAM,
and all agents are borrowing constrained. Financial development leads to an increase
in the unconstrained set and a decrease in the constrained set as more agents become
financially unconstrained. Thus, in the aggregate, the correlation between an agent’s talent
and sectoral capital intensity increases and the sorting gradually reverses. Furthermore,
financial development tends to induce shifts in sectoral employment shares. The specifics
of employment shifts depend on the distribution of talent and sectoral capital-intensities
in an economy. Yet simulations suggest that the employment shares of labor-intensive
sectors increase with financial development for a large range of specification.
I use EU-Klems data on 14 different sectors in 29 countries for up to 38 years in
order to compare my theoretical predictions with empirical data. In particular, I regress
sectoral capital intensity on the average sectoral wage for each country-year pair to obtain
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an estimate of the alignment between sectoral capital intensity and level of talent. Then
I regress these estimated alignment coefficients on the level of financial development,
controlling for country and year fixed effects, as well as other candidate explanations of
structural change. I carry out the same exercise for sectoral employment shares instead
of average wages. I find that financial development induces both sorting reversals and
structural change. The proxy for financial development, the ratio of private debt over
GDP, is highly significant and has the expected sign. The debt to GDP ratio increases
from an average of 0.47 to an average of 1.13 between 1970 and 2007 in the data set and
is able to explain substantial parts of the increase in the observed alignment between
sectoral capital intensity and the average sectoral wage in that period. In particular, the
predicted change in the average alignment coefficient due to financial development is 0.09
compared to an increase on average of 0.17 over the time period. The explanatory power
for structural change is smaller, albeit still significant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, I present a review of the literature.
Then I explain the basic mechanism of the model in a numerical example (section
1.2). Following this, I present the general model setup in section 1.3 and characterize
the competitive equilibrium (section 1.4). In section 1.5, I discuss the central sorting
properties, prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, and analyze the
consequences of financial development on sorting and structural change. In section 1.6, I
simulate the economy to show the extent to which structural change occurs, and I also
discuss the consequences on inequality. I empirically test for the two central predictions
of my model in section 1.8. Finally, I conclude in section 1.9. All of the proofs are
presented in the Appendix.
Review of the Literature This paper is related to several strands in the literature.
There are two main explanations for structural change. On the one hand, there is a
vast amount of literature on structural change based on non-homothetic preferences.3
3See Matsuyama (1992), Echevarria (1997), Laitner (2000), Caselli and II (2001), Kongsamut et al.
(2001), and Gollin et al. (2002).
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A similar approach is Stokey (1988) who bases her notion of structural change on a
hierarchy of needs.4 The argument is that economic growth implies that some goods in
the consumer consumption basket gain in importance relative to others. These relative
demand shifts lead agents to sort into sectors with increasing demand as the economy
grows. On the other hand, some authors follow Baumol (1967) and explain structural
change through supply-side or “technological" mechanisms.5 The principal mechanism is
that some sectors have higher exogenous growth rates in their total factor productivity
(TFP). Complementarities in consumption imply that labor moves away from these
sectors into sectors with slower TPF growth rates. My model is more closely related to
the supply side theories of structural change. I differ in that the structural change takes
place because of the decreasing supply of capital for financially unconstrained agents.
The decrease in capital occurs because of financial development and leads to resorting
into sectors with lower optimal capital-labor ratios.
This paper also contributes to the vast literature on the misallocation due to financial
constraints in occupational choice models. The two seminal papers in the literature
are Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993). Both papers generate
misallocation from imperfect capital markets in an economy populated by agents with
heterogeneous levels of wealth. In particular, they show that financial frictions cause
the long-run steady state distribution of income to become dependent on the initial
wealth distribution and thus generate the possibility of multiple steady states.6 In
my model the form of talent misallocation differs qualitatively from these approaches.
These studies show that financial constraints imply that wealth matters for occupational
4For related approaches see Foellmi and Zweimüller (2002), Matsuyama (2002) and Buera and Kaboski
(2012).
5Important contributions in that line of research are Ngai and Pissarides (2007), Zuleta and Young
(2007), and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008).
6Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000) extend this model by introducing heterogeneous talent. Other
important studies exploring the consequences of financial constraints on occupational choice are Bernhardt
and Backus (1990), Piketty (1997), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Galor and Moav (2000), and Gine and
Townsend (2004). Ghatak et al. (2001, 2007) focus on the possibility of multiple equilibria and the
political consequences of the interaction between credit markets and occupational choice.
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choice, and hence misallocation occurs as some agents with higher (lower) wealth and less
(higher) talent sort into industries they might not sort into without financial constraints.
Nevertheless, PAM occurs conditional on wealth. By contrast, my model features sorting
reversals resulting from the borrowing constraint conditional on wealth, that is, the
optimal PAM pattern reverses to the NAM pattern.
Legros and Newman (2002) show that financial constraints can distort the sorting
pattern. They model financial constraints by assuming that the productivity of a pair of
agents has to exceed the fixed costs of production by a certain margin in order to produce
output. Thus, some production cannot occur, even though the value of output exceeds
fixed costs, therefore making production efficient. This inefficiency changes the surplus
function of the agents and can thus distort PAM (where it was previously efficient). The
authors then use a numerical example to show that PAM can actually be distorted all
the way to NAM. By contrast, in my model PAM is inevitably distorted to NAM for
financially constrained agents. Furhermore, they consider team production, whereas I
show that sorting of agents into sectors can also be reversed without team production.
Buera et al. (2011) have recently estimated the importance of financial constraints
during growth by using firm-level data for Mexico and the United States. They find
that financial frictions explain substantial parts of the observed cross-country differences
in income. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) illustrate empirically the importance of intra-
sectoral misallocation between countries. These authors estimate the quantitative effect
of misallocation in China and India compared to the United States, and find that many of
the differences in income can be explained by misallocation. In a related paper Jeong and
Townsend (2007) focus on inter-sectoral differences. They point out the importance of
capital deepening and occupational shifts in explaining the very striking TFP growth in
Thailand between 1976 and 1996. My model indicates that comparisons of very narrowly
defined industries across countries may miss the point that the actual sorting pattern
differs across countries. Hence, agents within the same sector may be very heterogeneous
across countries.
The paper is also related to the work carried out by Sampson (2011). He observes
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systematic differences in the assignment function of heterogeneous talent into sectors
across countries. In contrast to my model, his aim to explain these differences through
differing production functions across countries, and not financial constraints. In particular,
the ranking of sectoral capital productivity differs across countries in his model, which
implies different sorting of agents into sectors across countries.
The importance of financial development for growth is documented in a survey by
Levine (2005). Furthermore, Beck et al. (2005) document the implications of well-
developed financial systems for economic development and the alleviation of poverty.
1.2 An Example
In this section I explain the central mechanism with a numerical example before I turn to
the general setup. The production function Y combines agent j’s talent θj with capital
X by using Cobb-Douglas technology, that is, Y (j, i,X) = θ1.2−αij Xαi where i denotes
the sector. The economy consists of a mass 1 of agents. There are two types of agents
with talent θL = 1 and θH = 4 and two sectors with capital intensities α1 = 0.3 and
α2 = 0.7. The fraction of high-skilled agents is q = 16 . The aggregate amount of capital
in the economy is X = 15. The goods prices are considered to be exogenous and equal to
p1 = 0.8 and p2 = 0.4 respectively.7
The agents choose the amount of capital X to use and the sector i to work in in
order to maximize earnings Π(i, j) = piθz−αij X(i, j)αi − rX(i, j). The capital rental rate
is denoted by r and determined in equilibrium such that the capital market clears, that
is, qXH + (1− q)XL = 15 where XH(XL) denotes the amount of capital contracted by
high-skilled (low-skilled) agents.8
7I discuss the assumption of exogenous goods prices later on (see section 1.4).
8Agents with the same level of talent always sort into the same sector and consequently contract equal
amounts of capital, except in the zero-probability event that one type of agent is indifferent to both
sectors.
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X(j, i)∗ 1 2
θL = 1 1.95 7.96
θH = 4 11.60 80.24
Table 1.1: Optimal Capital Choices
Π(j, i) 1 2
θL = 1 0.68 0.51
θH = 4 4.07 5.17
Table 1.2: Sectoral Earnings
Sorting Without Financial Constraints. I consider the sectoral choice and capital
allocation in an equilibrium without any financial constraints. The equilibrium capital
rental rate is r = 0.15. The first-order condition on capital choice implies that X(j, i)∗ =(piαi
r
) 1
1−αi θ
z−αi
1−αi is the optimal amount of capital used in sector i by agent j. In Tables
1.1 and 1.2, I show the optimal capital choice and the earnings of the agents in both
sectors respectively.
Profit maximization implies that low-skilled agents sort into the more labor-intensive
sector 1 and high-skilled agents sort into the more capital-intensive sector 2. Thus, PAM
prevails between agents’ talent and sectoral capital intensity.
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X(j, i)∗ 1 2
θL = 1 2.56 14.96
θH = 4 15.20 150.78
Table 1.3: Optimal Capital Choices
Sorting with Financial Constraints. However, if there is a borrowing constraint at
x = 20, then no agent can use more than 20 units of capital. Table 1.1 illustrates that
high-skilled agents are constrained in the more capital-intensive sector. If the interest
rate remains r = 0.15, then their earnings are lower in sector 2 at 3.51. This causes the
agents to resort into sector 1. The earnings of low-skilled agents do not change. Yet this
is not an equilibrium since the capital market does not clear. In particular, there is an
excess capital supply. In equilibrium, the capital rental rate falls to r = 0.12.
The unconstrained capital choices X(j, i)∗ at the new capital rental rate are shown
in Table 1.3. Only high-skilled agents are capital-constrained in sector 2. The sectoral
earnings are displayed taking into account that high-skilled agents only use x = 20 in
sector 2.
The equilibrium sorting reverses. High-skilled agents now prefer the more labor-
intensive sector while low-skilled agents maximize their earnings in the more capital-
intensive sector. Thus, NAM prevails between agents’ talent and sectoral capital intensity.
The reason for the resorting is different. High-skilled agents resort because of the
borrowing constraint that is less severe in more labor-intensive sectors. Low-skilled
agents, on the other hand, resort because of the equilibrium effect on the capital market.
Because the capital rental rate r decreases, their potential earnings increase more in more
capital-intensive sectors. This increase induces them to resort.
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Π(j, i) 1 2
θL = 1 0.74 0.80
θH = 4 4.41 4.03
Table 1.4: Constrained Earnings
1.3 The Model
I describe now the static structure of the model:
Agents. There is a continuum of agents of unity mass. Agent j possesses wealth w in
terms of the numéraire good capital and talent θj ∈ R≥0.9 Thus, the population is fully
characterized by a certain level of wealth w together with a cumulative talent distribution
function Φ(θ) (the corresponding pdf is denoted ϕ(θ)).10 I assume full support for θ and
label the least talented agent θ and the most talented agent θ.
Agents choose which good to produce, how much capital to use in production, and
what to consume. There is no disutility from work, and capital cannot be consumed.
These two assumptions imply that all agents are active in production and that storing
capital is a dominated choice.
There is a continuum of goods i. Agents’ preferences are described by the utility
function u(c) where u : R≥0 → R is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing,
and has the following standard properties: u′′ < 0 (i.e. the marginal utility is decreasing)
and u′(0) =∞. The consumption aggregator c across commodities is
c =
(∫ 1
0
c(i)
τ−1
τ di
) τ
τ−1
9I will use the labels talent and skills interchangeably throughout the paper.
10Note that the assumption of a degenerate wealth distribution is not necessary to obtain the results.
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where i ∈ [0, 1] denotes the good variety. The constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
between the different goods is indicated by τ .
Production. Every agent engages in the production of a single commodity. Hence
there are no firms. The output of sector i ∈ [0, 1] for agent j with talent θj together with
the amount of capital X is given by:
Yi(θj , X) = θz−αij Xαi
with z > 1 and capital productivity αi ∈ (0, 1). The production function has increasing
returns to scale, and the restriction on α implies that the output is concave in capital in
each sector. I also assume differentiability and continuity in the function that maps the
unit interval i into α, and rank the sectors according to their capital intensity, that is,
∂αi
∂i > 0. I denote αmin ≡ α0 and αmax ≡ α1. Thus, the sectors differ only in terms of
their capital productivity. 11
Borrowing Constraints. Financial markets are subject to frictions. Agents can lend
or borrow capital, but only up to a certain limit. The size of the borrowing limit is
determined, inter alia, by contract enforcement rights, property rights, the strength of
the judicial system, and in general the state of institutions in the economy. I define
L(θj , w) as the maximum amount of capital that an agent endowed with talent θj and
wealth w can borrow. In particular, I assume that the borrowing limit depends solely on
wealth w, L(θj , w) ≡ λw for all θj .12
11The qualitative result of sorting reversals is robust to the specific production function chosen. A
sufficient condition is that Yi(θj , X) is homothetic and exhibits increasing returns to scale between
talent and capital; and further is either log-supermodular or log-submodular in capital and the sectoral
characteristic. Whether the sorting reversals occur from NAM to PAM or vice versa depends on whether
the function is log-supermodular or log-submodular.
12This assumption can be based on asymmetric information about borrowers’ talent in the capital
market that results in borrowing limits that depend solely on their wealth. However, this rather strict
assumption is not necessary for the qualitative results (sorting reversals) to hold. What is required is
that among constrained agents 1+L(θj ,w)
θj
decreases in talent.
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1.4 The Agents’ Problem and Capital Market Clearing
In the following partial equilibrium, I assume that capital cannot be borrowed from the
world market, but that goods can be bought and sold at zero transportation costs from
the world economy at price p(i). Thus, the economy faces exogenous goods prices p(i) for
i ∈ [0, 1]. I use this assumption for two reasons. The first reason is tractability. Without
making any further assumptions on the distribution of agents and sectors, not all results
can be proven with endogenous prices. The second reason is that the equilibrium effects
on the financial markets are pivotal for the theoretical results in my model. Endogenous
goods prices do not alter the results on sorting reversals a great deal as the numerical
examples below show (see section 1.6).13
1.4.1 The Agents’ Maximization Decision
The agents’ maximization problem can be separated into two parts. First, the agent
maximizes consumption given her income ω(θj). Second, she chooses the sector and the
capital investment to maximize that income.
Consumption Maximization. Because agents can buy and sell products at world
market prices p(i) at zero transportation cost, the consumption decision is disentangled
from the production structure of the economy. In particular, the level of consumption
expenditure is ω(θj) =
∫ 1
0 c(i)p(i) di. Given the utility function, the optimal consumption
bundle is:
c(i) =
(
p(i)
P
)−τ
ω(θj) (1.1)
where P =
(∫ 1
0 p(i)1−τdi
) 1
1−τ . For all positive prices for goods, each and every single
variety of good i ∈ [0, 1] has a strictly positive demand.
13Yet to some extent they do matter as regards the effects on structural change as discussed below (see
1.5.3 and 1.6).
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Income Maximization. I also split the income maximization problem into two parts.
First, I consider the income maximizing choice of capital conditional on the sector i
chosen. Then, I turn to the income maximizing sectoral choice.
The agent chooses the capital that maximizes her income ω that is conditional on her
talent and sectoral choice i:
max
Xj
ω(θj) = p(i) θz−αij X
αi
j − rXj
s.t.Xj ≤ (1 + λ)w
Xj ≥ 0
where Xj is the amount of capital used in production. The loans received or given to the
capital market are defined as X˜j = Xj − w. If the borrowing constraint does not bind,
then the optimal amount of capital Xj∗(i, θj) used in the production in sector i by agent
j is determined by the first-order condition:
p(i)αi θz−αij X
αi−1
j∗ = r.
The amount of capital borrowed from or invested in the domestic capital market is thus
X˜j∗ = Xj∗−w.14 The marginal return to capital equals its marginal costs. The necessary
condition can be rewritten as: (
Xj∗
θj
)1−αi
= p(i)αi
r
θz−1j . (1.2)
The optimal capital-talent ratio is denoted s∗(i, θj) ≡ Xj∗(i,θj)θj for an agent with talent
θj active in sector i. It measures the optimal amount of capital used per unit of skill
and captures the extent to which agents optimally leverage their talent by combining
it with capital. The ratio increases in the good price p(i) and capital intensity αi and
decreases in the capital rental rate r. Importantly, the optimal capital-talent ratio rises
with the talent of an agent because of the increasing returns to scale.15 This rise implies
that more skilled agents contract over-proportionally more capital in equilibrium.
14I suppress the dependencies of the choice variables on the exogenous variables for notational conve-
nience when this does not cause confusion.
15If z equals to one (c.r.s.), then the ratio is identical for all agents.
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Borrowing Constraints. If Xj∗(i, θj) ≥ (λ + 1)w, then an agent is financially con-
strained in sector i and borrows up to her borrowing limit. In that case the marginal
rate of capital is higher than the capital rental rate,
p(i)αi θz−αij ((λ+ 1)w)αi−1 > r.
Whether or not the constraint binds depends on both the sector of production and the
agent’s talent. However, an agent’s borrowing constraint is more likely to bind if she is
highly talented, the sector is capital-intensive, or when general borrowing possibilities
(λ) are low.
Sector of Production. Agents take into account the optimal capital choice in sector
i when it comes to the sorting decision into sectors. The sectoral choice maximizes an
agent’s income and hence
i(θ) = arg max
i
p(i) θz−αij (Xj(θj , i, w))αi − rXj(θj , i, w) + rw (1.3)
where Xj(θj , i, w) ∈ {Xj∗(θj , i), (λ+1)w} depend on whether or not agent j is constrained
in sector i.
1.4.2 Capital Market Clearing
Every agent is endowed with w units of the numéraire good capital. Because the economy
is populated by a mass 1 of agents, the aggregate supply of capital is simply w. The
aggregate demand is given by the integral over all the agents’ capital choices. Every
agent with the same talent sorts into the same sector in equilibrium that implies that
they demand the same amount of capital. Thus, the capital market clears if and only if
∫
θj
Xj(θj , i(θj), w, r)ϕ(θj) dθj = w (1.4)
where i(θj) denotes the sectoral choice of an agent with talent θj , and I make explicit
the dependence of Xj on r.
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1.4.3 Equilibrium
I can now define a competitive equilibrium in this setup as
• an allocation of agents to sectors i(θj),
• consumption c(i, ω(θj)),
• an allocation of capital to agents Xj(i, θj , w),
• and a capital rental price r,
such that:
1. Agents choose the capital allocation, Xj(i, θj , w), and the sector, i(θj , w), to
maximize their earnings ((1.2) and (1.3)).
2. The agents choose their consumption patterns c(i, ω(θj)) to maximize their
utility (1.1).
3. And the capital market clears (1.4).
1.5 Equilibrium Properties
Before I characterize the equilibrium, I need to make an assumption on the exogenous
goods price function.
Assumption 1.1.
The price function p is continuous and differentiable.
This assumption is in accordance with the assumption of CES preferences. With
endogenous goods prices, the assumption of CES preferences has two consequences. First,
the price function must be continuous in i. A non-continuous price function implies
that some sectors are dominated by others; that is, no agent chooses to be active in
the dominated sectors. Second, Xj∗(i, θj , w) is strictly monotonically increasing in i. If
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Xj∗(i, θj , w) were decreasing for some i, some sectors were dominated.16 I also assume
that p is differentiable.17
1.5.1 Sorting
The main focus of the paper is on the effect of financial development on sorting. Financial
development is defined as an increase in the borrowing constraint, λ. The central
theoretical result is that the equilibrium matching between agents and sectors reverses due
to financial development. The reversal also depends quantitatively on other parameters
of the model, but my focus is on the increases in λ because the qualitative fact of sorting
reversals depends exclusively on the borrowing constraint.
Unconstrained Sorting. First, if any pair of agents is unconstrained in any pair of
sectors, then the borrowing constraint does not bind for either agent in those sectors.
Therefore, the marginal product of capital is equalized across both agents. In other words,
the necessary condition for an interior solution (1.2) holds. In that case, the following
proposition applies:
Proposition 1.1.
For any pair of agents j and j′ with θj > θj′ sorting into two sectors i and i′ with αi > αi′ ,
PAM prevails in any equilibrium if the necessary condition for an interior solution (1.2)
holds for both agents in both sectors.
The proofs of all propositions are in the Appendix. Note that not every good has to
be in positive supply as I consider a small open economy with fixed goods prices p(i).
The reasoning is that efficiency implies that highly talented agents use large amounts
of capital relative to their talent. From the first-order condition on capital choice, we know
that the optimal capital-talent ratio Xj∗(i,θj ,w)θj increases with talent under increasing
16In the Appendix I show that in a closed economy, all equilibrium price functions have to meet these
conditions (and hence world economy prices have to meet them as well).
17The assumption on differentiability is only used to prove proposition 1.8 below.
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returns to scale. Therefore, the most skilled agents sort into the most capital productive
sectors where they can optimally leverage their higher level of talent.
Constrained Sorting. The reasoning differs when two agents are constrained in two
sectors. Then, both agents borrow up to the borrowing limit irrespective of their sectoral
choice. In this case, sorting is characterized by the reversed proposition.
Proposition 1.2.
For any two agents j and j′ with θj > θj′ sorting into two sectors i and i′ with αi > αi′ ,
NAM prevails in any equilibrium if the borrowing limit binds for both agents in both
sectors.
If agents are constrained, then there is no difference in capital usage between more
and less skilled agents. Thus, the highly talented agents sort into the sectors with the
larger marginal labor productivity.
Sorting Reversals. I expand on this result on sorting reversals by relating it to a paper
by Costinot (2009) which discusses log-submodularity between agents characteristics
and sectoral characteristics as a sufficient condition for PAM. In my model, the sectoral
choice depends exclusively on the talent via the capital-to-talent ratio s(i, θj) ≡ Xj(i,θj)θj
of the agents, not θj directly. To see this, note that earnings for constrained agents can
be rewritten as
p(i) θzj s(i, θj)αi − rλw.
The last term is independent of the sectoral choice and thus can be discarded when
it comes to sorting. Thus, the optimal choice implies that p(i) s(i, θj)αi is maximized
because θzj affects earnings in all of the sectors equally. For unconstrained agents, the
FOC (1.2) implies that the payoff is
p(i) θzj (1− αi) s(i, θj)αi ,
and hence the optimal choice implies that p(i) (1− αi) s(i, θj)αi is maximized because
again θzj affects earnings in all sectors equally. Log-supermodularity prevails between s
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and αi as
∂2 ln(ω(θj))
∂α ∂s(i, θj)
= 1
s(i, θj)
for both unconstrained and constrained agents. Thus, agents with a higher capital-to-
talent ratio sort into more capital-intensive sectors.
Yet, for constrained agents, the least talented have higher capital-talent ratios because
Xj = (1 + λ)w for all θ. Therefore, s(i, θj) = (1+λ)wθj decreases in talent. Thus, more
talented agents sort into less capital-intensive sectors, and NAM holds.18
By contrast, the optimal capital-talent ratio s∗(i, θj) ≡ Xj∗(i,θj)θj increases in talent for
unconstrained agents because of the increasing returns to scale. Therefore PAM prevails
among unconstrained agents. Because more talented agents use a higher capital-talent
ratio, they obtain optimal leverage for their talent if they choose the more capital-intensive
sectors. With constant returns to scale (z = 1), the sorting between unconstrained agents
is indeterminate.
Assignment Function. So far I have analyzed the sorting between any pair of agents
that is either constrained or unconstrained. I turn now to the aggregate equilibrium
assignment function i(θ) of agents to sectors. I first define the marginally constrained
agent as θ∗(λ) ≡ θj : Xj∗(i(θj), θj , λ, w) = (1 + λ)w. Then, the following result holds in
any equilibrium.
Proposition 1.3.
The economy can be separated into two convex sets θ ∈ [θ, θ∗(λ)] and θ ∈ [θ∗(λ), θ]. Every
agent in the set [θ, θ∗(λ)] is unconstrained, and PAM holds within the set. Every agent
in [θ∗(λ), θ] is constrained, and NAM holds for these agents.
The reason is that in equilibrium, no agent can be constrained when a more talented
agent is unconstrained as the marginal return to capital is higher for more talented
agents. Consequently, the most talented agents are constrained. The economies rank
18Furthermore, NAM holds if the borrowing constraint L(θj , w) depends on talent as long as
∂
(
(1+L(θj,w))w
θj
)
∂θj
< 0.
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generally somewhere between zero-borrowing constraints and infinite borrowing possibili-
ties. Therefore, they are characterized by a mix of PAM and NAM. PAM prevails for
less talented agents; while NAM prevails among more skilled agents.
Financial Development. Sorting reversals occur with financial development. As
borrowing possibilities in an economy improve, PAM applies to a larger set of agents.
More specifically, θ∗(λ) increases in λ. The following proposition characterizes the process
of sorting reversals due to increases in the borrowing level λ.
Proposition 1.4.
• For every level of wealth w, there is a λ∗(w) such that for every λ > λ∗(w) the
sorting in the whole economy is characterized by PAM.
• For every 0 < λ < λ∗(w), the sorting in the economy is PAM for some agents and
NAM for the others.
• The capital rental rate r increases in λ for all λ < λ∗(w).
• θ∗(λ) increases in λ for every λ < λ∗(w). θ∗(0) = θ and θ∗(λ∗(w)) = θ.
First, irrespective of level of wealth, there is some level of financial development
for which society as a whole is characterized by PAM. In that case, further financial
development has no effect on the equilibrium assignment. Second, NAM only prevails
in the whole economy for zero borrowing possibilities. Because the marginal returns to
capital are not equalized, any positive level of borrowing constraint implies that some
amount of capital is traded. Therefore, some agents have to supply capital to the market
and hence become unconstrained.
In general, financial development increases the feasible set of capital allocation to
agents. An increase in λ leads to an increase in capital demand of constrained agents
and consequently to an increase in the capital rental rate r. This increase implies that
unconstrained agents lower the used capital-to-talent ratio. Therefore, they sort into more
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Figure 1.3: Equilibrium sorting for different λ
labor-intensive sectors as the optimal sectoral choice increases in s(i, θj). By contrast,
constrained agents use a higher capital-talent ratio because of financial development and
sort into more capital-intensive sectors. In particular, the marginally constrained agent
becomes unconstrained, and the θ∗(λ) increases.
The process of sorting reversals is qualitatively displayed in Figure 3 which depicts
the assignment function i(θ). First, λ = 0, and NAM prevails throughout the economy.
The increases in λ (first to λ1, then to λ2) imply that some constrained agents become
unconstrained and resort into less capital-intensive sectors. By contrast, the agents that
remain constrained sort into more capital-intensive sectors. For the set of constrained
agents, NAM prevails while the set of unconstrained agents is characterized by PAM. Note
that some agents first sort upwards (while being constrained), and then sort downwards
(after being unconstrained) during the process of financial development.
In particular, except λ = 0 and λ > λ∗(w), there are always sectors with multiple
types of agents. Specifically, constrained and very talented agents and unconstrained
22 CHAPTER 1. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND SORTING REVERSALS
agents with more modest talent sort into the same sector which maximizes earnings for
both. The agent with modest talent rents out part of her capital endowment, and the
highly talented agent borrows up to her constraint.19
1.5.2 Existence and Uniqueness.
In this subsection, I prove that the equilibrium always exists and furthermore that it is
unique.
Proposition 1.5.
A unique equilibrium always exists.
Furthermore, the equilibrium is equivalent to the social planners solution given the
borrowing constraint. In this sense, it is also is constrained efficient, that is, maximizing
national output at given prices conditional on the borrowing constraint.20
Whether the equilibrium is also Pareto optimal (unconstrained efficient) or not depends
on the borrowing constraint λ and the level of wealth w, as well as the distributions of
talent θ and capital productivity αi, and the degree of increasing returns to scale, z.
1.5.3 Structural Change - The Allocation of Labor.
Up to this point I have discussed the sorting reversals that occur with financial devel-
opment. I will now examine the consequences of financial development on structural
change, that is, the shifts in sectoral employment shares. In contrast to my results
on sorting reversals, the direction of structural change depends on the openness of an
economy. Hence, the assumption of exogenous goods prices is not innocent in this context.
Therefore, I will first discuss the effects on employment shares in an economy with both
exogenous goods prices and an exogenous capital rental rate. Then, I will turn to the
qualitative predictions in the case of an endogenous capital rental rate. In the simulation
19The empirical observation that labor productivity dispersion within a sector is higher in developing
than developed countries is consistent with this.
20Because complete markets exist the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics guarantees
constrained efficiency (and hence existence and uniqueness).
1.5. EQUILIBRIUM PROPERTIES 23
exercise below (see section 1.6) I also use endogenous goods prices to show that the effect
of financial development on structural change is heavily dependent on the openness of an
economy.
It is important to note that the aggregate consequences of the resorting of constrained
and unconstrained agents are not independent of the distribution of both talent and sec-
toral characteristics in an economy. As long as λ < λ∗(w), financial development implies
that constrained agents resort into more capital-intensive sectors, and unconstrained
agents resort into more labor-intensive sectors. Whether or not the employment shares
then increase in rather labor-intensive or capital-intensive sectors depends on the size
of the change in the capital rental rate r due to financial development. This change
depends quantitatively on both distributions. Thus, the relative supply of highly talented
agents vs. less talented agents plays a role in sectoral employment shifts with financial
development.
Exogenous Goods Prices and Capital Rental Rates. As a first step, I analyze
employment shifts for an economy with both exogenous goods prices p and an exogenous
capital rental rate r. Sorting reversals still occur in this case. Sorting for constrained
agents is characterized by NAM while it is characterized by PAM among unconstrained
agents. The difference is that with an exogenous capital rental rate r, unconstrained
agents do not resort because their optimal capital-talent ratio does not change. Thus,
because no agents resort into the more labor-intensive sectors with financial development,
and constrained agents resort into more capital-intensive sectors, the following proposition
holds:
Proposition 1.6.
With exogenous goods prices p(i) and an exogenous capital rental rate r, the share of labor
sorting into the most labor-intensive sectors decreases with financial development, that is:
d
(∫ i
0
∫
θj∈Ωi ϕ(θj)dθjdi
)
dλ
≤ 0 ∀ i,
with the inequality being strict for every i(θ) < i < i(θ∗(λ)) and λ < λ∗(w).
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In other words, the mass of agents that sort into sectors [0, i] (weakly) decreases in
the borrowing constraint, λ.
Exogenous Goods Prices and Endogenous Capital rental rates. With an en-
dogenous capital rental rate, there are two effects. On the one hand, as λ increases,
agents can obtain more leverage for their talent and thus tend to resort into more
capital-intensive sectors. This direct effect is opposed by a general equilibrium effect that
is only present if the capital rental rate is endogenous: As λ goes up, the capital rental
rate increases, which pushes the agents towards more labor-intensive sectors.
Therefore, with an endogenous capital market, the effects of financial development on
sectoral employment shares depend crucially on the initial conditions. If most agents
are borrowing constrained, then the employment shares in the capital-intensive sectors
increase with financial development. The reason is that for constrained agents, the
direct effect dominates, and they sort into more capital-intensive sectors with financial
development.
By contrast, if most agents are unconstrained, then an increase in the borrowing
possibilities leads to shifts in the employment shares to more labor-intensive sectors. As
the general equilibrium effect dominates for unconstrained agents, the employment shares
of labor-intensive sectors increase if initially most agents are already unconstrained.
Proposition 1.7.
For low levels of financial development, a marginal increase in financial development
causes employment shares to increase in relatively capital-intensive sectors. By contrast,
for high levels of financial development, further increases in the financial development
raise the employment shares in labor-intensive sectors. Mathematically,
if i(θ) > i(θ),
d
(∫ i
0
∫
θj∈Ωi
ϕ(θj)dθjdi
)
dλ < 0 ∀ i < i(θ), and
if i(θ) < i(θ) and λ < λ∗(w),
d
(∫ i
0
∫
θj∈Ωi
ϕ(θj)dθjdi
)
dλ > 0 ∀ i < i(θ).
In words, if i(θ) > i(θ) then the mass of agents that sort into the sectors [0, i] decreases
in the borrowing constraint λ for all i < i(θ). In contrast, if i(θ) < i(θ) the the mass
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of agents that sort into the sectors [0, i] increases in the borrowing constraint λ for all
i < i(θ). This proposition analyzes shifts in sectoral employment shares for a subset of
sectors and for specific initial conditions.
A second analytical result is that economies face sectoral concentration with financial
development. Sectoral concentration for a set Ψ of agents is defined as a decrease
in the range of the set of sectors that the set Ψ sorts into. That is, the range of
{i ∈ [0, 1]|i ∈ i(θ) ∧ θ ∈ Ψ} decreases with financial development. I also define the set
of unconstrained, interior agents as ΨU (λ) ≡ {θ|X(θ, λ) = X∗(θj , i(θ), λ) ∧ i(θ) ∈ [0, 1)}.
These are all unconstrained agents except for those who sort into the most capital-intensive
sector. The set of constrained, interior agents is defined as ΨC(λ) ≡ {θ|X(θ, λ) =
(1 + λ)w ∧ i(θ) ∈ (0, 1]}. This set contains all constrained agents except those who sort
into the most labor-intensive sector.21 Then, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1.8.
For the sets ΨU (λ) and ΨC(λ) for some λ, any increase from λ to λ′ leads to sectoral
concentration of the sets ΨU (λ) and ΨC(λ).
This proposition implies that the sectoral allocation becomes more concentrated. For
both the set of agents who have been unconstrained initially and the set of agents who have
been constrained initially, the range of sectors the agents sort into decreases with financial
development. For unconstrained agents, the reason is that earnings are most responsive
to increases in r in the most capital-intensive sectors. Therefore, unconstrained agents
who were initially active in sectors with higher capital intensity resort more compared to
agents already active in relatively labor-intensive sectors. Therefore the set of sectors
unconstrained agents sort into decreases. In much the same way, for constrained agents
earnings are most responsive to improvements of borrowing possibilities in the more
capital-intensive sectors. Therefore, the most talented constrained agents, who are
initially active in very labor-intensive sectors, resort the most. Thus, the set of sectors
constrained agents sort into also decreases. This proposition does not hold for agents that
21I have made this exclusion because the first-order condition for sectoral choice does not hold for
excluded agents; that is, they do not choose an interior solution.
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become unconstrained with financial development, but only for those who were either
already unconstrained initially, or who remain constrained after financial development.
However, this result on sectoral concentration does not tell us where these agents
center. In particular, either there is a concentration towards relatively intermediate
sectors (neither very labor-intensive nor very capital-intensive) or sectoral polarization
- both very labor-intensive and very capital-intensive sectors experience increases in
sectoral employment shares. Numerically, I find that - particularly in the late stages -
financial development displays concentration in form of sectoral polarization. Modestly
talented agents sort into very labor-intensive sectors because of the high capital rental
rates while highly talented agents sort into very capital-intensive sectors to optimally
leverage their higher levels of talent. This qualitative feature of structural change depends
on the assumption of exogenous goods prices in contrast to the first one discussed. In
simulations, using endogenous goods prices, this polarization only exists for very high
levels of elasticity of substitution in consumption.
1.6 Simulation
I simulate the model in order to show the differences between the effect of financial
development on structural change with exogenous and endogenous goods prices. In
particular, simulations of a closed economy indicate that sectoral employment shares in
labor-intensive sectors increase with financial development.
Endogenous goods markets imply an additional force for shifts in sectoral employment
shares. Financial development causes the unit of labor active in capital-intensive sectors
to become more productive as compared to labor-intensive sectors. Both the talent
and the capital active in capital-intensive sectors increase with financial development.
Complementarities in consumption imply that labor-intensive sectoral employment shares
grow.22 This is essentially the mechanism that drives the structural change in models
based on a technological structural change such as Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008).
22With substitutability in consumption this would tend to increase employment shares in capital-
intensive sectors.
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In a closed economy, goods markets have to clear alongside the capital market. Market
clearing requires that for every sector i,∫
θ
c(i, θ)ϕ(θ)dθ =
∫
θ∈Ωi
Y (i, θ)ϕ(θ)dθ
where Ωi denotes the set of agents active in sector i. The equation can be rewritten as∫
θ
(
p(i)
P
)−τ
ω(θ)ϕ(θ)dθ =
∫
θ∈Ωi
θz−αi(Xj(θ, i, w))αiϕ(θ)dθ
where P =
(∫ 1
0 p(i)1−τdi
) 1
1−τ . The amount of any good supplied in the economy has to
equal the demand for that commodity. The optimal consumption pattern between two
sectors i and k for any agent j together with goods market clearing implies that(
p(i)
p(k)
)−τ
=
∫
θ∈Ωi Y (i, θ)ϕ(θ)dθ∫
θ∈Ωk Y (k, θ)ϕ(θ)dθ
.
Parameter Choice. Technology-driven theories of structural change such as Ngai and
Pissarides (2007) and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) require either complementarity
or substitutability in consumption in order to generate structural change. Therefore, I
simulate the model with an elasticity of consumption τ = 1 to shut down this channel.
Thus, the simulation also helps to highlight the additional channel of structural change
present in my model and differentiates my approach from theirs.
The degree of increasing returns is z = 1.2. Different choices for that parameter make
the results more pronounced, but do not change them qualitatively. In principle, an
increase in z is equivalent to an increase in the skewness of the talent distribution. I use
85 industries whose capital intensity α is uniformly distributed between 0.3 and 0.9. The
distribution of talent is log-normal. The amount of agents is 10, 000.23 I give the results
using two wealth levels, 50 and 100, and the degree of borrowing possibilities ranges from
λ = 0.01 to λ = 10. This allows me to discriminate between the channels of economic
and financial development.
23I am aware that the amounts of agents and sectors are rather low for the theoretical two-sided
continuum assumption considered. These amounts also prevent the continuity result for sectoral choice
from becoming visible. Neither an increase in the amount of sectors nor the agents changes the qualitative
picture. Moreover, different talent distributions do not change the qualitative results.
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Parameter choices
z 1.2
αmin 0.3
αmax 0.9
τ 1
# Industries 85
Results. The main conclusion of the simulation is that financial development leads to
substantial shifts in sectoral employment shares to more labor-intensive sectors in a closed
economy. I have experimented with a variety of different parameter constellations and
the effects of financial development on structural change do not reveal much variation.
Furthermore, financial development plays quite a different role from economic devel-
opment, which is represented by increases in the wealth endowment level. Both types of
development imply that the economy is able to produce capital-intensive goods at a lower
cost. Hence, the price of labor-intensive goods raises. 24 The intuition for the increase in
labor-intensive goods prices with financial development is that output is most responsive
to a relaxation of the borrowing constraint in the most capital-intensive sectors. Fur-
thermore, sorting reversals induces the talent of agents active in capital-intensive sectors
to increase. Both forces imply that financially developed countries have a comparative
advantage in the production of capital-intensive goods. Hence, the relative prices of
labor-intensive goods increase with financial development.
Yet the capital rental rate decreases with economic development while it increases with
financial development.25 Therefore, economic development leaves the sorting pattern
24The exact amount of increase in my simulation is reported below.
25Here too, the respective numbers of my simulation are provided below.
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largely unchanged whereas financial development induces both sorting reversals and
structural change. The reason is that higher levels of wealth make capital in general more
abundant, and thus lower the capital rental rate. Thus, the capital demand increases
as well as its supply. In reality, financial and economic developments go hand in hand.
Thus, my theory predicts the prices of labor-intensive goods to increase but whether the
interest rate increases or decreases with development is ceteris paribus ambiguous and
depends on the specifics of the economy.
In Figures 1.4 and 1.5, the assignment function i(θ) of the agents to sectors is
depicted for two wealth levels w = {50, 100} and four different borrowing limits, λ =
{0.01, 0.4, 1, 10}. The x-axis depicts the talent percentile of the agents, and the y-axis
depicts the sectors. With almost no borrowing possibilities, λ = 0.01, almost every agent
is borrowing constrained. Only the very least talented agents lend capital to all other
agents. Therefore, the sorting pattern is characterized by NAM for almost all agents
for both levels of wealth. When borrowing opportunities increase, more agents become
unconstrained. As shown above analytically, unconstrained agents form a convex set at
the lower end of the talent distribution. Sorting among these agents is characterized
by PAM, whereas sorting among constrained agents is characterized by NAM. The
discontinuity in the sorting pattern occurs due to the discretized version of the model.
Thus, agents do not smoothly resort from the most capital-intensive sectors into the
more labor-intensive ones.26
Even with borrowing possibilities of ten times its wealth, almost 5% of the population
remains constrained. This is because the log-normality of the talent distribution implies
huge differences for optimal capital choices, in particular among the top percentiles of
the talent distribution. As a comparison of the two figures indicates, wealth has a very
small impact on the sorting pattern. No large differences exist in the sorting, although
the level of wealth doubles.27
Figure 1.6 shows the aggregate allocation of labor.28 In a closed economy, financial
26This discontinuous sorting would not occur with a continuum of sectors.
27Different levels of wealth do not change the result.
28I only show the results for wealth w = 50 as it is clear that the graph for w = 100 has to look very
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Figure 1.4: Occupational Choice
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Figure 1.6: Employment Shares
development implies that sectoral employment shares of labor-intensive goods increase.
This reverses the analytical result on structural change in an open economy with both
fixed goods prices and capital rental rates. With endogenous goods prices, the model
implies that the employment shares in the labor-intensive sectors increase with financial
development. Note that this effect is not only because there are more low-skilled than
high-skilled agents in the economy. Sectoral employment shares in the labor-intensive
sectors for high levels of financial development far exceed those of the capital-intensive
sectors at low levels of development.
The pattern of structural change is similar when I consider different levels of elasticity
of substitution, although the quantitative picture looks slightly different. In particular,
sorting is more responsive to changes in wealth in these cases. More specifically, in line
with Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), I find that a high level of substitutability leads to
increases in the employment shares of the capital-intensive sectors due to increases in
wealth and the opposite occurs for low levels of elasticity of substitution.
similar.
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The capital rental rate increases substantially with financial development. This effect
is more pronounced for low levels of wealth. In the two scenarios depicted in the figures,
the rate rises from r = 0.0976 to r = 0.1197 with level of wealth of w = 50, and from
r = 0.0598 to r = 0.740 with a wealth level of w = 100. These numbers also show the
effect that an increase in wealth reduces the capital rental rate. Financial development
also leads to an icrease in the relative prices for the labor-intensive goods. As already
mentioned, relative prices also increase with wealth. Considering a wealth level of 50, the
relative price between the most labor-intensive and most capital-intensive good rises from
p(1)
p(85) = 5.1655 to
p(1)
p(85) = 6.4418. By contrast, with a wealth level of 100, the relative
price increases from p(1)p(85) = 8.5358 to
p(1)
p(85) = 9.7297.
Comparison Between Open and Closed Economies. If the economy faces both
an exogenous capital rental rate and exogenous goods prices, financial development causes
sectoral employment shares to increase in the capital-intensive sectors. Hence, the results
are reversed. With an endogenous capital rental rate, sectoral concentration occurs.
Simulation results indicate that for financially developed countries this concentration
takes the form of sectoral polarization. Hence, I conclude that both the strength and the
direction of structural change due to financial development are highly influenced by the
openness of an economy.
1.7 Earnings Inequality
This section briefly addresses the effects of financial development on income inequality. In
particular, I show that financial development leads to a decrease in low-income inequality
and a simultaneous increase in top-income inequality. This result holds both for exogenous
and endogenous goods prices. In order to demonstrate this, I will first show the analytical
results with exogenous goods prices and then turn to simulation results with endogenous
goods prices.
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1.7.1 Labor Income Elasticity
Analytically, the elasticity of the labor earnings can be used as a measure of inequality.
A higher earnings elasticity for some level of talent implies a steeper earnings function at
that point.
Unconstrained Sorting. Among unconstrained agents, the elasticity of labor earnings
is largest for the most talented agents within that set. The reason is that more skilled
agents contract over-proportionally more capital and sort into sectors where the output
is more responsive to increases in the capital-talent ratio. Mathematically, the labor
earnings of an agent j are given by
ν(i(θj), θj , w) = p(i(θj)) θz−αij Xj(i(θj), θj , w)αi − r Xj(i(θj), θj , w).
When an agent is unconstrained, the envelope theorem implicates that the marginal labor
earnings are
∂ν(i(θj), θj , w)
∂θj
= z − αi1− αi r
(
p(i)αi
r
) 1
1−αi
θ
z−1
1−αi
j
1− αi
αi
,
and hence the earnings elasticity reduces to
ν(i(θj), θj , w) =
∂ν(i(θj),θj ,w)
∂θj
θj
ν(i(θj), θj , w)
= 1 + z − 11− αi .
This equation shows that the earnings elasticity increases with the capital intensity of
a sector and therefore also with talent because PAM prevails for unconstrained agents.
Hence, the curvature of the earnings function is steepest for the most talented agents.
This is consistent with the empirical observations on wage inequality which found that it
is largest among the top percentiles of the income distribution.29
29I can also show this curvature more directly. The first derivative of the labor earnings function
can be rewritten as ∂ν(i(θj),θj ,w)
∂θj
= z−αi(1−αi)θj ν(i(θj), θj , w). This equation allows me to calculate the
second derivative as ∂
2ν(i(θj),θj ,w)
∂θ2
j
= z−11−αi
z−αi
(1−αi)θ2j
ν(i(θj), θj , w) + z−1(1−αi)2θj ν(i(θj), θj , w)
dαi
dθj
. Because
PAM prevails, the last term is positive and so is the second derivative. Hence, the labor earnings function
is convex for unconstrained agents.
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Constrained Sorting. This result no longer holds unambiguously for constrained
agents. Their earnings can be represented by
ν(i, θj , w) = p(i) θz−αij (w + λw)αi − (1 + λ)rw.
Given that ∂ν(i,θj ,w)∂i = 0 because of the maximization problem for the agent, and
dw
dθj
= 0
because of the talent-independent borrowing constraint; the earnings derivative is
dν(i, θj , w)
dθj
= ∂ν(i, θj , w)
∂θj
= (z − αi) p(i) θz−αi−1j (w + λw)αi ,
and the earnings elasticity is
∂ν(i(θj),θj ,w)
∂θj
θj
ν(i(θj), θj , w)
= z − αi
1−
(
w+λw
θj
)1−αi r
p(i)θz−1j
.
The denominator is equal to the labor intensity of sector i populated by constrained
agents with talent θj and therefore necessarily increases in talent. However, the numerator
also increases in talent because of NAM. This implies that in general for constrained
agents, whether the wage inequality is higher among low-skilled or high-skilled agents is
ambiguous.30
Effects of Financial Development. I now turn to the effects of financial development
on wage inequality. First, I consider agents who are already unconstrained before the
increase in λ. Because these agents sort into more labor-intensive sectors, their wage
elasticity decreases. Thus, the labor income inequality for agents with modest levels of
talent falls because of financial development. Because less talented agents lend more
capital to the market and the capital rental rate increases with financial development,
this effect is reinforced when considering overall income. This is a potential explanation
for the recent decrease in inequality among low-skilled agents in developed countries.
Financial development is relatively good news for the least talented agents because they
sort into the most labor-intensive sectors where the rise in the capital rental rate r does
not affect them much.
30In the same way, the sign of the second derivative cannot be established unambiguously.
1.7. EARNINGS INEQUALITY 35
By contrast, the effects on constrained agents are generally ambiguous. Because
constrained agents sort into more capital productive sectors due to financial development,
both the labor intensity (denominator) and the labor productivity (numerator) decrease.
But eventually, the first effect dominates the latter and the inequality increases. The
reason is that the income elasticity converges with the equation for unconstrained agents
in which case an increase in αi unambiguously increases the income inequality. This is in
line with the huge increases in income inequality within the top percentiles of the income
distribution in recent years. The argument is that while modestly talented agents already
have been unconstrained, the top agents have become more and more unconstrained in
recent years, which implies an increase in wage inequality among them.
1.7.2 Simulation Results
Figure 1.7 depicts the earnings function for three different levels of borrowing constraints
and a wealth level of w = 50. The other parameters are as discussed earlier. As in the
case of the exogenous goods prices, financial development decreases the income inequality
among low-skilled agents, while at the same time increasing the top income inequality.
In contrast to the theoretical analysis I depict overall earnings here, i.e. labor earnings +
capital earnings. The reason is that I want to discuss both effects. Nevertheless, I will
also present the change in inequality for pure labor earnings.
The principal reason for the decreasing inequality among low-skilled agents is that
the least talented agents profit the most from an increase in the capital rental rate r
because their opportunity cost of renting out capital is very low. In Figure 1.8, I display
the decrease in inequality among low-skilled agents. The 50 : 10 earnings ratio decreases
from 1.21 to 1.15 with financial development. The respective ratio for pure labor income
decreases from 1.84 to 1.79.
The increase in earnings inequality in the top percentiles of income distribution occurs
because the highest benefits from additional borrowing possibilities occur for the most
talented individuals as their marginal return from employing more capital is the highest.
The ratio of earnings between the 99th and 90th percentiles increases from 2.11 to 2.84.
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Figure 1.7: Earnings Distribution
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Figure 1.8: Earnings Distribution - Bottom
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Figure 1.9: Earnings Distribution - Top
Figure 1.9 shows this huge increase in top-income inequality. The increase in pure labor
income is even from 2.73 to 4.20. Furthermore, not all agents necessarily gain from
financial development. The figures show that the rise from λ = 1 to λ = 10 makes some
talented agents worse off when borrowing constraint increases. To summarize, I find that
financial development has important impact on earings inequality. In particular, it can
explain the simultaneous decrease in low-income inequality and the huge increases in
top-income inequality that is empirically observed. This holds both with exogenous and
endogenous goods prices and for both labor earnings and total income.
1.8 Empirics
I now compare the theoretical predictions with empirical findings. A word of caution
here: in this section my aim is not to establish any causality, but rather to check whether
the empirical data supports my theory. The two central propositions of my model are
that financial development induces sorting reversals and structural change. The former
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implies that the set of agents for which PAM holds increases. The latter implies that
at least for closed economies, the set of agents that sort into labor-intensive industries
increases.
So far I have used the terms capital productivity and capital intensity interchangeably.
Empirically, I cannot observe the sectoral capital productivity α. Thus, I proxy it with
the capital intensity of a sector; that is, the share of value added that accrues to capital.
Lemma 1.1 shows that this is consistent with my model. Higher values of α are associated
with higher levels of capital intensity.
Lemma 1.1. The capital intensity increases with the capital productivity α for both
constrained and unconstrained agents.
Yet, the alignment of capital intensity with average talent is negative for constrained
agents because of NAM and is positive for unconstrained agents because of PAM. This
implies that I expect the alignment of the capital intensity with the average talent of a
sector to increase with financial development as the set of agents characterized by PAM
increases.
Furthermore, I have used the term “agent” without resorting to any notion of worker
or entrepreneur in the theoretical part. To be more precise in this section I assume them
to be entrepreneurs in the following as they contract capital. Yet, I do not possess data
on individual entrepreneurs, and hence I am unable to test the proposition of sorting
reversals directly. Instead, I test how well the sectoral capital productivity is aligned
with the average sectoral wage. The latter is a proxy for entrepreneurial talent. In the
Appendix 1.10.2, I provide a theoretical extension in which the entrepreneurs can employ
both capital and labor to show that the paid wages are aligned with entrepreneurial
talent. Furthermore, sorting reversals occur in this extension as well. Among constrained
entrepreneurs, the more talented ones sort into more labor-intensive sectors. By contrast,
more skilled entrepreneurs sort into more capital-intensive sectors when they are uncon-
strained. Therefore, the average sectoral wage is an appropriate proxy for the average
entrepreneurial talent in a sector.31
31If, in turn, agents are assumed to be workers, then wages are a proxy for talent. Empirically, data
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This leads to the first theoretical prediction to be tested empirically:
Prediction 1.1. The alignment of the average sectoral wage with sectoral capital intensity
increases with financial development.
This prediction is independent of whether or not goods prices are endogenous, that
is, whether the economy is closed or open.
By contrast, the theoretical predictions for the direction of structural change depend
on the openness of an economy. The above simulations indicate that in a closed economy,
sectoral employment shares in labor-intensive sectors increase with financial development.
These numerical results are robust for various different specifications. In the extension
more entrepreneurs sort into more labor-intensive sectors with financial development.
Yet, the fact that more talented entrepreneurs employ more workers may counteract
the robust simulation results from above. This makes the following prediction is rather
suggestive.
Prediction 1.2. The alignment of the employment share with sectoral capital intensity
decreases with financial development in a closed economy.
I use a two-step strategy to test the predictions of my model. To test for sorting
reversals, I regress sectoral capital intensity on the average sectoral wage for each
country-year pair. Then, in a second step, I regress the estimated β-coefficients on
financial development. In the same way, I regress sectoral capital intensity on the sectoral
employment share for each country-year pair to test for structural change. However, in
the second step, I not only regress on the financial development indicator, but also on
the interaction between financial development and economic openness to assess the effect
of financial development in a closed economy.
on the skill levels of workers by sector is only available at high levels of aggregation for most countries.
The evidence suggests that wages are a good proxy for talent (see, e.g. Krueger and Summers (1987)
and Abowd et al. (1999)). Yet, this assumption were to imply that the borrowing constraint of the firm
would depend on the number of workers.
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1.8.1 Alternative Candidate Explanation - Technological Change
I am aware that there are other candidate explanations for structural change and for
sorting reversals. Non-homothetic preferences and technological change are the most
prominent explanations for structural change. Technological change is also a potential
candidate explanation to explain sorting reversals. I will briefly present a model of
technological change that can explain the change in the alignment of the average sectoral
wage with sectoral capital intensity over time.32
The models presented by Ngai and Pissarides (2007), and Acemoglu and Guerrieri
(2008) on technologically-driven structural change cannot simply be extended to incor-
porate sorting reversals along the growth path. Extending their models to allow for
heterogeneous talent and increasing returns to scale, is not enough to generate sorting
reversals. The reason is that any change in the ranking of sectors with respect to their
capital intensity is accompanied by a change in the sorting behavior of heterogeneous
agents. In other words, the relationship between talent and sectoral capital-intensity
remains the same.
In order to observe the empirical pattern of sorting reversals, the sectors that make
more intense use of highly-skilled labour have to become more capital-intensive over
time. A simple production function that can generate sorting reversals is a Cobb-Douglas
production function in capital, high-skilled and low-skilled labor. Output in sector i at
time t is given by
Yit(LH , LL, X) = Kαit
(
LβitH L
1−βit
L
)1−αit
where K is the amount of capital used in production, LL is the amount of low-skilled
labor, and LH the amount of high-skilled labor. The capital intensity at time t is denoted
by αit and the high-skill intensity among labor by βit. With some fixed amount of capital,
high-skilled and low-skilled labor in the economy, there will be some equilibrium capital
rental rate rt and market clearing wages wHt and wLt for the high-skilled and low-skilled
labor.
32Two key contributions in the literature that relate the sorting pattern to technological progress are
Galor and Tsiddon (1997) and Caselli (1999).
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If the capital intensity in the more high-skill intensive sector (with large βit) is low
(low αit), then average wages are higher in the labor-intensive sector. High capital
intensity (high αit) in the more high-skill intensive sector means that average wages are
relatively high in the capital-intensive sector. Hence, if technological change implies that
the capital intensity of the relatively high-skill intensive sectors increases over time, then
average wages increase in capital-intensive sectors as the proportion of high-skilled agents
in those sectors increases. Such an ad hoc model of exogenous technological change can
replicate my predictions for sorting reversals. I will therefore include technological change
as an alternative explanation for sorting reversals in my regressions.
1.8.2 Data
The main data set is taken from the EU-Klems database that covers 29 countries over the
period 1970 - 2007. In my main specification, I use 14 industries for each country-year
pair.33 In particular, the variables on sectoral capital intensity, average wage, and the
employment share are taken or constructed from this database. I match the data set
with the financial development indicators from the World Bank Financial Development
Database. Further controls are taken from the UN database, the Penn World Table, and
the CANA database.
The EU-Klems database comprises 25 European Union countries plus Australia,
Japan, Korea, and the United States.
The specific advantage of this data set is that it covers the whole economy. The
analytical analysis shows that the process of resorting as a result of financial development
is non-monotonic for some sectors. More specifically, many sectors experience both
increases and decreases in average sectoral talent during periods of financial development.
33Due to its specific characteristics I have excluded the agricultural sector. I also do not disaggregate
the manufacturing sector any further, because otherwise the results obtained may depend heavily on one
sector with an average employment share of 20% (which decreased from approximately 25% to 17% in
the time period). Furthermore, McMillan and Rodrik (2011) reveal the special nature of manufacturing
(unconditional convergence), and this raises further doubts about the advisability of including more
disaggregated data on that sector.
42 CHAPTER 1. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND SORTING REVERSALS
Therefore, the theoretical predictions on the effect of financial development may not be
clear if sectoral coverage is only for a subset of the economy.
A central question is how to proxy for financial development. Theoretically, financial
development is equal to increases in the borrowing possibilities of the agents. I proxy
borrowing possibilities with actual borrowing.34 The indicator for the level of financial
development is the ratio of private debt over GDP. In particular, the ratio is private
credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions over GDP.35
There are other candidate explanations of structural change, in particular based on
non-homothetic preferences and technological change. Therefore, I control for these two
channels. I use the log(GDP ) as a proxy for non-homothetic preferences. As income
increases, the optimal consumption basket changes. This leads to changes in sectoral
employment shares because of the altered demand. In particular, if consumption shifts
to more labor-intensive goods with income (e.g. services), I expect that GDP per capita
causes the alignment of sectoral employment shares with sectoral capital intensity to
decrease.
It is more difficult to control for technology-driven structural change. The commonly
used proxy for technological change is the relative price for investment goods (versus
consumption goods). The data is taken from the Penn World Table and translated
using investment-specific and consumption-specific PPP exchange rates. Because I am
interested in the relative price of investment faced by domestic producers, I follow
Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013), and divide the
relative price of a country’s investment by that of the United States. This ratio is then
34As long as any increase in borrowing constraints is accompanied by an increase in actual borrowing,
this approximation holds. In my model this occurs as long as the economy is not completely unconstrained.
35This is a commonly used proxy for financial development taken from the World Bank Financial
Development Database by Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Ross Eric Levine, Martin Cihak and Erik
H.B. Feyen, labeled “pcrdbofgdp” in the data set (see, e.g. Beck et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2007)).
For robustness checks, I also use the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks over GDP (labeled
“pcrdbgdp” in their database) and total liabilities over GDP (“llgdp”, for example used in King and
Levine (1993)).
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multiplied by the ratio of the investment price deflator to the personal consumption
expenditure deflator for the United States, which is obtained from the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis. This gives the relative price of investment measured at domestic
prices for each country.36
I proxy economic openness with the ratio of the sum of exports and imports over GDP.
Then I add several country-year specific variables that have potential effects on the sorting
pattern within a country for robustness. In particular, I control for the gross enrollment
ratio in tertiary education in order to account for human capital accumulation, the
number of telephones subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants as a proxy for the infrastructure
in the economy, and the Gini-coefficient to help capture the variance in the distribution
of talent. Moreover, I use some indicators of political stability such as the Corruption
Perceptions Index, a political rights indicator, and a civil rights indicator. All of these
control variables are taken from the CANA database.
1.8.3 Construction of Variables
The average hourly sectoral wage is given in the EU-Klems database. For sector i in
country h at time t, I label the wage
ω¯ht (i).
The capital intensity of sector i in country j at time t is calculated as
CIht (i) ≡ 1−
∑
j∈Ωht (i) ω
i
t(j)∑
k V A
i
t(k)
where ωit(j) denotes the labor earnings of individual j in sector i at time t, V Ait(k) the
value added of firm k in sector i at time t, and Ωht (i) denotes the set of individuals active
in sector i in country h at time t. The latter ratio is the aggregate labor payments in a
sector over the aggregate value added in that sector. Both variables can be observed in
the EU-Klems database.
36As a robustness check, I use the ratio of the R&D-expenditure to GDP in a country and the number
of patents per 1,000 inhabitants as proxies for technological change.
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The employment share is calculated as the proportion of individuals active in sector i
in country h at time t:
piht (i) ≡
N iht
Nht
where Nht denotes the number of individuals active in economy h at time t, and N iht
denotes the number of individuals at time t active in sector i in country h.
The alignment of the average sectoral wage with the capital intensity can vary because
of changes in the intensive and extensive margins. The former is an increase in the
alignment of the capital intensities with the sectoral wages without any change in the
ranking. This is not necessarily an indicator of sorting reversals. Therefore, I construct
the ranks of the sectoral capital intensity and the average wages, respectively, in order to
only observe the extensive margin. This is an indicator of sorting reversals because there
have to be changes in the ranking of either the capital intensities or the average wages to
have variation in the estimated alignment coefficients.37
I denote the capital intensity rank of sector i in country y at time t as r(CIht (i)).
The rank of the average sectoral wage is labeled r(ω¯ht (i)). Thus, to test the predictions
on sorting reversals, I run the following regression for each country-year pair:
r(CIht (i)) = α+ βwh,tr(ω¯ht (i)) + i,j,t. (1.5)
I exclude the sectors with negative capital intensities in this regression. The reason is that
data analysis suggests that most negative capital intensities result from governmental
subventions as negative capital intensities occur particularly often in sectors such as
mining or agriculture.38
The analogous regression for each country-year pair to test the prediction on structural
change is
CIht (i) = α+ βeh,tpiht (i) + i,j,t. (1.6)
37As a robustness check I also redo the exercise without using ranks. The results do not change
qualitatively.
38Including these sectors does not alter the results significantly. I also exclude the country-year pairs
for which less than 8 data points are available. The same holds for the next regression for the sectoral
capital intensity on the employment shares.
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I do not use ranks in that regression as I am interested in both the extensive and intensive
margin when it comes to the alignment between the sectoral capital-intensity and the
employment shares.
In Figure 1.10, I show the alignment of the average sectoral wages with capital
intensity over time for two countries in the sample: the United States and Korea. I
chose these countries because the United States represents the most advanced economy
in the data set, and South Korea because it has experienced the greatest growth. In 1970,
the GDP per capita in South Korea was 284$ in US-$ at current prices. In 2007, GDP
amounted to 22,090 US-$.39 This implies that while the GDP per capita of South Korea
was 5.81% of that of the United States in 1970, it rose to 47.83% in 2007.
I plot the estimated β coefficients from regressing the sectoral capital intensities on
the average sectoral hourly wage for both countries over time. The figure shows that
the estimated βs are positive for the United States for all years. Nevertheless, I observe
a further increase in the alignment of the sectoral capital intensities with the earnings
over time.40 By contrast, the coefficient of the alignment for South Korea is negative for
most years in the sample and only turns positive in the late 1990s. A negative coefficient
indicates that wages are higher in more labor-intensive sectors. This is consistent with
my model for the early stages of financial development.
The alignment of the sectoral capital intensity with the employment shares over time
is depicted in Figure 1.11. While the β coefficient is always negative for the United
States, it is significantly positive for South Korea until the early 1990s. In both figures I
observe a rather steep trend in South Korea compared to the United States. This is not
surprising given that the period was characterized by enormous growth for South Korea
as compared to the United States.
These figures indicate that there is some relation between development and the
alignment of the sectoral capital intensities with average wages and employment shares.
In order to see whether this is because of financial development, I regress the β coefficients
39See http://data.un.org for the UN data for “Per capita GDP at current prices - US dollars".
40Note that the β coefficients are bounded between −1 and 1 as it is a rank regression.
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Figure 1.10: The alignment between sectoral capital intensity and wages
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Figure 1.11: The alignment between sectoral capital intensity and employment shares
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on the financial development indicator while controlling for other variables.
The central regression on testing sorting reversals is then
βˆwh,t = α+ νh + νt + γFDFDh,t−2 +Xh,t−2γ + j,t (1.7)
where γh indicates the country fixed effects, νt the year fixed effects, FDj,t−2 the financial
development indicator in country h at t−2, and Xh,t−2 stands for a vector of country time
specific control variables. I use the financial development indicator and controls lagged
by two years.41 The reason is twofold. The main reason is that financial development as
well as technological change require some time until they translate into changes in the
sectoral wage levels. Therefore, the financial development and technological change in the
past that have effects on the alignment of the sectoral wages with the capital intensities
today. Furthermore, to some extent, I account for the potential reverse causality problems
because the alignment of the wages with the capital intensity today should not greatly
influence past financial development.
The analogous regression equation for structural change is
βˆeh,t = α+ νh + νt + γFDFDh,t−2 +Xh,t−2γ + γI(FD ∗ EO)h,t−2 + j,t. (1.8)
It is important to include the interaction term (FD ∗EO) between financial development
and economic openness in the regression because I predict that financial development
causes shifts to labor-intensive sectors in a closed economy. If I add the interaction term,
then the coefficient γFD can be interpreted as the marginal change of βˆeh,t due to an
increase in financial development conditional on the level of economic openness being
zero.42
The average level of financial development is 0.73 with a standard deviation of 0.4.
In Figure 1.12, I depict the levels of financial development for the United States and
South Korea. For both countries, I observe a huge increase over time.
41The results do not change a great deal if I lag by one year or three years.
42Deriving the above equation with respect to FD shows this.
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Figure 1.12: The level of financial development over time
1.8.4 Regression Results.
In all the regressions I weight observations by total employment, control both for country
and year fixed effects, and use clustered standard errors. This is necessary as the errors
within a country are likely to be correlated.
I am aware that including clustered standard errors can be problematic as the number
of clusters included is not particularly large given that the data set only covers 29 countries.
Therefore, the estimated standard errors may still be too small. On the other hand,
because I use the estimated β-coefficients in my regression analysis as dependent variable
the standard errors in the second regression might be too high because of measurement
errors in the first regression stage.
Sorting Reversals. The regression results for my main specification are shown in
Table (1.5). In the first column, I regress βˆwh,t on the financial development indicator alone.
The coefficient is positive and highly significant. This indicates that financial development
is conducive to sorting reversals, the alignment of the ranks of sectoral capital intensity
with the ranks of average hourly wages increases with financial development.
In the second column I include the proxies for the alternative theories of structural
change: the relative price of investment and the log(GDP ). I find that the coefficient on
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financial development remains highly significant. The technological change also appears
to be conducive to an increase in the alignment of sectoral capital intensity with wages.
As the relative price of investment decreases, the β coefficient increases. The significance
of the technological change channel disappears when I include the above mentioned
control variables.
The average level of financial development in the first three years in the data set
(1970− 1972) is 0.49. For the last three years (2003− 2005) it is on average 0.92. This
implies that the predicted increase of the alignment coefficient between sectoral capital
intensity and average wage during this period is (0.92− 0.49) ∗ 0.218 = 0.09, all other
things remaining equal. The observed average increase in the alignment coefficient
is approximately 0.17. This implies that financial development is able to explain a
substantial fraction of the average increase in alignment between capital intensity and
average wage over the period covered. Nevertheless, there is still a rather large degree
of heterogeneity across countries, which is to be expected given the heterogeneity in
countries’ characteristics.43
Structural Change. The regression results for the alignment between employment
shares and sectoral capital intensity are in Table (1.6). In the first column, I regress
the estimated β coefficients on the country and year fixed effects together with the
financial development indicator (again, controlling for the country clustered standard
errors). I find a negative sign that indicates that higher levels of financial development
lead to employment shifts towards more labor-intensive sectors. Yet, the coefficient is
not significant at the conventional significance levels. In the second column, I include
the economic openness indicator and interact it with financial development. Now, the
financial development indicator becomes significant. This is in line with the prediction
that in a closed economy employment shares increase in labor-intensive sectors due to
43Including financial development in the regression accounts for approximately 15% of the unexplained
variation compared to only regressing on country and year fixed effects. Mathematically, 1− adj.(R2)
decreases by 15%. The rather low additional explanatory power this seems to indicate is not surprising
given that fixed effects already account for more than 85% of the observed variation.
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Table 1.5: Sorting Reversals - in Ranks
Dependent Variable: Alignment btw
Capital-Intensity and Average Wage (βˆwh,t) (1) (2) (3)
L2.Financial Development (FD) 0.218∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.0565) (0.0627) (0.0302)
L2.Rel. Price of Investment -0.347∗ -0.159
(0.200) (0.203)
L2.log(GDP per capita) 0.0344 0.0766
(0.0719) (0.0495)
Controls No No Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 789 789 547
R2 0.818 0.822 0.887
adj. R2 0.802 0.806 0.873
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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financial development. Furthermore, the interaction term has the expected sign, higher
levels of economic openness imply that financial development leads to less structural
change to the labor-intensive sectors. The coefficient on financial development remains
significant if I add the other candidate explanations for structural change and control
variables.
The observed average change in the alignment coefficient between sectoral capital
intensity and employment shares is −0.35 over the period examined. The observed change
in financial development predicts an average change of (0.92− 0.49) ∗ 0.33 = −.14. Thus,
the relative explanatory power of financial development for structural change seems to
be smaller compared to sorting reversals.44 Again, note that there is a great deal of
heterogeneity across countries, which is to be expected given the heterogeneity in country
characteristics and my theoretical predictions for the effects of economic openness on the
coefficient of financial development.
My theory is supported by the data which suggests that financial development leads
to sorting reversals and structural change. The latter effect only appears to be significant
for a closed economy: a degree of openness equal to zero. Another support for my theory
is that regressing the change in the ranking of the employment shares of a sector over
time on the change in the rank of the average sectoral wages over time gives a slope
coefficient of −0.027 with a robust t-statistic of 5.86. Thus, the employment shares tend
to increase in lower wage sectors.
I do not draw any conclusions about the importance of the other two channels for
structural change. The predictions on the relation between the alignment of employment
shares with sectoral capital intensities and the other candidate explanations are ambiguous.
On the one hand, this is because different countries in the sample are at different stages
of development. On the other hand, there is no clear-cut prediction as to why these
theories should be related to the capital intensities of sectors. Neither non-homothetic
preferences nor technological change necessarily imply that the employment shares
44Moreover, the share of unexplained variance that financial development can explain is lower for
structural change. 1− adj.(R2) decreases by around 6% compared to 15% in the case of sorting reversals.
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Table 1.6: Structural Change
Dependent Variable: Alignment btw
Capital-Intensity and Employment Share (βˆeh,t) (1) (2) (3) (4)
L2.Financial Development (FD) -0.330 -0.622∗∗ -0.392∗ -0.505∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.233) (0.194) (0.175)
L2.i.FD*EO 1.043 0.670 0.475
(0.616) (0.465) (0.367)
L2.Economic Openness (EO) -0.463 -0.548 -0.952
(0.641) (0.889) (1.012)
L2.Rel. Price of Investment 1.533 1.539∗
(1.185) (0.830)
L2.log(GDP per capita) -0.661 -0.516
(0.402) (0.466)
Controls No No No Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 772 544 544 532
R2 0.846 0.875 0.885 0.902
adj. R2 0.832 0.862 0.872 0.889
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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increase or decrease in capital-intensive sectors.
With non-homothetic preferences, there is a great deal of debate on whether or not
goods consumed relatively heavily at latter stages of development (especially services)
are more or less labor intensive. Furthermore, not all countries in the sample are equally
developed. Latvia and Lithuania are certainly at different stages of development than
Sweden and the Unites States.
Technological change can occur in many ways that affect the sorting behavior of agents.
Besides raising the TFP in relatively capital-intensive sectors (see Acemoglu and Guerrieri
(2008)), technological change can also alter the relation between the capital intensity
and high-skill intensity, or cause switches from log-supermodularity to log-submodularity,
or from decreasing to increasing returns. Because my theory indicates that all of these
things are related to sorting, it is not clear what to predict for the change in alignment
of sectoral capital intensity with employment shares due to technological change.
Furthermore, even in technologically-driven models of structural change, the expected
sign on the coefficient of the proxy for technological change depends on the elasticity of
substitution. If the elasticity of substitution in consumption is greater (smaller) than
one, I expect the sign to be negative (positive). I actually find that the coefficient on the
relative price of investment is negative and significant for a number of countries, inter alia
the United States, when I run separate regressions for the countries.45 This suggests that
in the United States, technological change tends to raise employment in capital-intensive
sectors. This is in line with the finding of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) on decreases
in the labor share. However, other countries show positive coefficients, and consequently
I refrain from drawing any particular conclusions. It would be interesting to explore
further the potential explanations for the differences in the signs of the coefficients across
countries. This is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this paper.
In general, I would like to test the theory more directly by using a micro-level data
45Clearly, I cannot control for year-fixed effects in this framework. Generally, I find some heterogeneity
in the signs of the coefficients of the proxies for both technological change and non-homothetic preferences
when I run the regressions for each country separately. I find much less heterogeneity in the sign on the
financial development indicator.
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set to test the predictions of my model; in particular, the hump shape of the sorting
pattern of agents to sectors. This will be a subject for future research.
Robustness Checks. I perform the following robustness checks.46 First, I run the
same regressions including sectors with negative capital intensity. The coefficients on the
effect of financial development on the alignment of the sectoral capital intensity with the
average wage are slightly smaller but remain highly significant. The same holds true for
the effect of financial development on the alignment of sectoral employment shares with
sectoral capital intensities. I also take three-year averages of the observations in order to
control for short-run fluctuations and the results do not change.
Furthermore, I run the regression of the capital intensities on the average wages for
each country-year pair without taking ranks. Instead, I weight the observations by their
relative employment share. The coefficients are still positive but only significant at the
5% or 10%-level. Then, I use the fraction of high-skilled agents instead of the average
sectoral wage in the first step regression on sorting reversals. I have less observations as
data on the share of high-skilled agents is not available for some countries. Nevertheless,
the coefficient on financial development is positive and highly significant.47
I also use different proxies for technological change. In particular, both the ratio of
R&D expenditure over GDP as well as the number of patents per 1,000 inhabitants do
not alter the qualitative results. The inclusion of different sets of control variables does
not vary the results much either.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I propose a theoretical model of the occupational choice of financially
constrained agents. My central result is that financial development implies sorting
46I do not give the results of the robustness checks here due to space constraints. All results are
available on request.
47In this case, 1− adj.(R2) decreases by approximately 23% when including the financial development
indicator compared to only regressing on country and year fixed effects.
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reversals. Relaxing the borrowing constraint leads to a switching in the sorting behavior
of agents. When financially unconstrained, more talented agents sort into more capital-
intensive sectors, which reverses the sorting pattern for financially constrained agents.
This feature can be observed empirically and is associated with financial development.
Furthermore, financial development can induce structural change, that is, shifts in sectoral
employment shares. I discuss the possible consequences of financial development on
structural change analytically and numerically. Empirically, I observe that financial
development induces the employment shares to increase in relatively labor-intensive
sectors, which is consistent with my model.
The goal of the model is to highlight a new channel for structural change through
sorting reversals. In addition to illustrating how (financial) development can be asso-
ciated with changing employment shares across sectors, the model also emphasizes a
changing composition of the workforce across sectors. It is important to understand the
heterogeneous sorting patterns of agents towards sectors across the world. Furthermore,
I show that this channel has non-trivial impacts on inequality. In particular, it is able to
explain the huge increase in top-income inequality in developed countries in recent years
together with the simultaneous decrease in low-income inequality.
Because governments can strengthen property rights and other institutions conducive
for financial development, there is good reason to believe that they can loosen borrowing
constraints.48 My model highlights the novel features of the associated economic responses.
I plan to extend the model in order to analyze further the economic relevance of
sorting reversals. More specifically, I want to allow for heterogeneous wealth in a dynamic
framework and to analyze the dynamic saving incentives of heterogenous agents, in
particular under endogenous human capital formation, learning-by-doing and trade.
Furthermore, I plan to analyze the model’s predictions empirically using a micro dataset
that allows me to test directly for the hump-shaped sorting pattern predicted by my
model.
48See for example Beck and Levine (2008) and Chinn and Ito (2006) for the importance of institutions
for financial development.
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An empirical phenomenon that fits the picture depicted by my theory is remigration
in China. Several decades ago, borrowing conditions were low in China and many high-
skilled Chinese migrated to the United States and Europe. In recent years, however,
borrowing conditions have greatly improved in China and these migrants are remigrating
to China as capital becomes increasingly abundant. It would be interesting to explore
whether this empirical phenomenon is associated with financial development and sorting
reversals.
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1.10 Appendix
1.10.1 Proofs
Discussion of Assumption 1.1
Proof. I justify assumption 1.1 by showing that in any closed economy, the equilibrium
price function has to possess the mentioned properties. I first prove that p(i) is continuous.
Suppose that it is not continuous, in particular that there is a discontinuity at i′,
limi→i′+ p(i) ≡ p(i′+) 6= limi→i′− p(i) ≡ p(i′−). Without loss of generality, I assume that
p(i′+) > p(i′−). For constrained agents, this condition implies that the earnings in i′+ are
strictly greater for every agent than in i′−,
p(i′+)θzj
(
(1 + λ)w
θj
)αi′+
> p(i′−)θzj
(
(1 + λ)w
θj
)αi′−
for all j because αi is continuous in i.
The same holds for unconstrained agents. The earnings of every agent are greater in
i′+ than in i′− because
(
αi′+p(i
′
+)
r
) 1
1−α
i′+ θ
z−α
i′+
1−α
i′+
j r(
1
αi′+
− 1) >
(
αi′−p(i
′−)
r
) 1
1−α
i′− θ
z−α
i′−
1−α
i′−
j r(
1
αi′−
− 1)
because of the continuity of earnings in αi and the continuity of αi in i.
This implies that no agent chooses to be active in sector i′−. This contradicts the
clearing of the goods market because the utility function implies that every commodity
is demanded to some extent at any positive price. Therefore, p(i) has to be continuous
in equilibrium.
A corrolary of the restriction that every sectors has to be chosen by some agents
is that Xj∗(i, θj , w) is continuous in i. From an agent’s perspective, Xj∗(i, θj , w) is a
function of two continuous variables, αi and p(i). Inspection of equation (1.2) shows
that the RHS of the equation has to be continuous, αip(i) is continuous if both αi and
p(i) are continuous. Therefore, the LHS has to be continuous as well and implies that
Xj∗(i, θj , w) is continuous given that αi ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof of proposition 1.1
Proof. The sectoral allocation is governed by the earnings maximization of the agents. If
no borrowing constraints bind the FOC; then (1.2) holds for every agent, that is, agent j
with talent θj produces by using Xj∗(i, θj , w) amounts of capital. This implies that an
agent’s earnings can be rewritten as
ω(i, θj , w) = p(i) θz−αij (Xj∗(θj , i, w))αi − rXj∗(i, θj , w) + rw =
= r
(
p(i)αi
r
) 1
1−αi
θ
z−αi
1−αi
j (
1
αi
− 1) + rw.
Note that the last term, rw, is independent of sectoral choice.
Consider now two agents j and j′ with θj > θj′ , and two sectors i and i′ with i > i′
(and hence αi > αi′). I proceed by contradiction. Suppose sorting is characterized by
NAM. The sorting is characterized by NAM if and only if
ω(i, θj , w) < ω(i′, θj , w)
and
ω(i, θj′ , w) > ω(i′, θj′ , w).
These two conditions can be rewritten as
(αi
r
) 1
1−αi(αi′
r
) 11−αi′
1
αi
− 1
1
αj
− 1 θ
(z−1)(αi−αi′ )
(1−αi)(1−αi′ )
j <
p(i′)
1
1−αi′
p(i)
1
1−αi
and (αi
r
) 1
1−αi(αi′
r
) 11−αi′
1
αi
− 1
1
αj
− 1 θ
(z−1)(αi−αi′ )
(1−αi)(1−αi′ )
j′ >
p(i′)
1
1−αi′
p(i)
1
1−αi
.
The ratio of the sectoral prices is exogenous. Hence, both agents may prefer one sector
over the other. But for NAM suppose w.l.o.g. that both agents sort into different sectors.
Then, the necessary and sufficient condition for NAM is
(αi
r
) 1
1−αi(αi′
r
) 11−αi′
1
αi
− 1
1
αj
− 1 θ
(z−1)(αi−αi′ )
(1−αi)(1−αi′ )
j <
(αi
r
) 1
1−αi(αi′
r
) 11−αi′
1
αi
− 1
1
αj
− 1 θ
(z−1)(αi−αi′ )
(1−αi)(1−αi′ )
j′ .
1.10. APPENDIX 59
This simplifies to
θ
(z−1)(αi−αi′ )
(1−αi)(1−αi′ )
j < θ
(z−1)(αi−αi′ )
(1−αi)(1−αi′ )
j′
that can never be true as θj > θj′ and αi > αi′ . Thus, PAM has to prevail for any pair
of unconstrained agents.
Note that z > 1 is necessary for this result to be true. Constant returns to scale make
the sorting indeterminate, and z < 1 implies that NAM prevails.
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Proof. If the borrowing limit always binds, then the earnings of agent j in sector i are
given by:
ω(i, θj , w) = p(i) θz−αij ((1 + λ)w)αi − r(1 + λ)w.
As before, considering two agents and two sectors, the sorting is characterized by PAM if
and only if
ω(i, θj , w) > ω(i′, θj , w)
and
ω(i, θj′ , w) < ω(i′, θj′ , w).
These two conditions are now
θz−αij ((1 + λ)w)αi
θ
z−αi′
j ((1 + λ)w)αi′
>
p(i)
p(i′)
and
θz−αij′ ((1 + λ)w)αi
θ
z−αi′
j′ ((1 + λ)w)αi′
<
p(i)
p(i′)
Again, suppose that both goods are in positive supply. The necessary and sufficient
condition is
θz−αij ((1 + λ)w)αi
θ
z−αi′
j ((1 + λ)w)αi′
>
θz−αij′ ((1 + λ)w)αi
θ
z−αi′
j′ ((1 + λ)w)αi′
,
or equivalently
θ
αi′−αi
j > θ
αi′−αi
j′ .
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This condition can never be fulfilled because θj > θj′ and αi > αi′ . Therefore, NAM
prevails for any pair of constrained agents. Note that this result does not depend on
increasing returns to scale. It resembles the standard matching results following Becker
(1973).
Proof of Proposition 1.3
Proof. First, I show that if an agent with talent θ′ is unconstrained in sector i′ , then
@θ < θ′ : i(θ) > i′ . Hence, all agents with talent θ < θ′ are unconstrained as well, and
PAM prevails for all agents with talent θ < θ′ .
Then, I show that if an agent θ′ is constrained in sector i′ , then @θ > θ′ : i(θ) > i′ .
Thus, all more talented agents are constrained as well, and NAM prevails for this set of
agents.
These two facts combined prove proposition 1.3.
Part 1. I restrict attention to sectors active in equilibrium. In these sectors, Xj∗(i, θj , w)
is strictly and monotonically increasing in i. To see this, suppose that Xj∗(i′, θj , w) >
Xj∗(i, θj , w) for some i′ < i. The FOC on capital (1.2) allows the rewriting of the earnings
ω(i, θj , w) = rXj∗(i, θj , w)( 1αi − 1) for unconstrained agents. Hence, if Xj∗(i′, θj , w) >
Xj∗(i, θj , w), then
rXj∗(i′, θj , w)(
1
αi′
− 1) > rXj∗(i, θj , w)( 1
αi
− 1)
as αi increases in i. No unconstrained agent sorts into sector i. If no unconstrained agent
sorts into sector i then constrained agents do not sort into that sector either. The reason
is that while unconstrained agents can adjust their capital choice in different sectors,
constrained agents cannot. Therefore, if the goods prices are such that no unconstrained
agent sorts into the more capital-intensive sector, then neither does any constrained
agent.
For proving the first part of the proposition, assume that agent θ′ is unconstrained in
sector i′ ≡ i(θ′). As shown, Xj∗(i, θj , w) is continuous and strictly and monotonically
increasing.
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Hence, either there is a sector i′′ : Xj∗(i
′′
, θ
′
, w, λ) = (1 + λ)w or Xj∗(1, θ
′
, w, λ) <
(1 + λ)w, that is, the agent is unconstrained in every sector.
In the latter case, there cannot be any less talented agent in i > i′ by PAM for
unconstrained agents (because less talented agents are unconstrained a fortiori as capital
demand increases in talent).
In the former case, there may not be any agent with talent θ < θ′ in any sector
i ∈ [i′ , i′′ ]. If there were this would have to imply PAM between these two agents as
the lower talented agent is also unconstrained. Hence, PAM prevails between agents in
i ∈ [i′ , i′′ ]. But then the agent with talent θ′ cannot be marginally constrained in i′′
because the agent θ(i′′) has to be unconstrained in order for PAM to prevail. I conclude
that if an agent with talent θ′ is unconstrained in sector i′ , then @θ < θ′ : i(θ) > i′ .
Part 2. For the second part, assume that agent θ′ is constrained in sector i′ ≡ i(θ′).
Any more skilled agent is constrained in sector i′ as well. Furthermore, both the agent
with talent θ′ and any more talented agent are constrained in any sector i > i′ .
But proposition 1.2 implies that NAM prevails for any pair of agents that are
constrained in any pair of sectors. Thus @θ > θ′ : i(θ) > i′ .
Proof of Proposition 1.4
Proof. I will prove the four statements of the proposition in turn.
Statement 1. First, λ =∞ implies that every agent is unconstrained. Because PAM
prevails for any pair of unconstrained agents, the whole economy is characterized by
PAM. Because a change in λ changes continuously the feasibility set of capital allocations
∃λ∗(w) <∞ such that the whole economy is characterized by PAM, and every agent is
unconstrained. Further increases in λ increase the feasible set of allocations. But because
sorting is already characterized by the efficient solution at λ∗(w), the allocation of capital
does not change. Hence, for every λ > λ∗(w) the economy is characterized by pure PAM.
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Statement 2. Because agents are heterogeneous in talent and sectors in capital pro-
ductivity, the marginal returns to capital cannot be equalized across agents at λ = 0
(conditional on efficient sorting). Hence, any λ > 0 implies that gains of trade in capital
can be realized. Thus, some agents rent out capital and become unconstrained. From
proposition 1.3, I know that these agents form a convex set at the bottom of the talent
distribution and that PAM prevails for these agents.
Statement 3. To prove that the capital rental rate increases in the borrowing constraint,
suppose that λ increases for any λ < λ∗(w), and the capital rental rate r does not increase.
In particular, suppose it remains constant.
The capital demand for the set of unconstrained agents does not change because
neither r nor the exogenous goods prices p(i) change, and thus sectoral choice does not
change either. By contrast, the capital demand of the set of constrained agents increases
because the marginal return to capital is larger than r before the change in λ.
This implies that there is excess demand for capital; that is, capital market clearing
does not occur, since it did clear before the change of λ. If the capital rental rate decreases,
then the capital demand increases for both constrained and unconstrained agents. The
capital market does not clear either. Hence, this cannot represent an equilibrium. I
conclude that the capital rental rate r has to increase for any λ < λ∗(w).
Statement 4. Lastly, I prove that θ∗(λ) increases with λ. The part of an unconstrained
agent’s earnings that depends on the sectoral choice can be written as
ω(i, θj , w)− rw = r
(
p(i)αi
r
) 1
1−αi
θ
z−αi
1−αi
j (
1
αi
− 1).
Taking derivatives implies that
∂2 log(ω(i, θj , w)− rw)
∂r∂αi
= −1
r(1− αi)2 < 0.
Hence, because the capital rental rate increases the optimal sectoral choice for any
unconstrained agent decreases. As the agent with talent θ∗(λ) is marginally unconstrained
her optimal sectoral choice also decreases.
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In turn, for constrained agents the part of earnings that depends on the sectoral
choice is
ω(i, θj , w) + r(1 + λ)w = p(i) θz−αij ((1 + λ)w)αi .
Note that this implies that the agent is constrained irrespective of the sector chosen. This
assumption is w.l.o.g because there is a continuum of sectors, and hence the marginal
choice is between two sectors where in which she is constrained. Thus, any marginal
change in the capital rental rate does not affect the sectoral choice. By contrast, the
choice is influenced by the change in the financial constraint, λ. Again, taking derivatives
implies that
∂2 log(ω(i, θj , w) + r(1 + λ)w
∂λ∂αi
= 1(1 + λ) > 0.
Thus, the optimal sectoral choice increases for any constrained agent in λ. Therefore, a
more skilled agent is marginally unconstrained at a higher level of λ.
With λ = 0, proposition 1.2 applies for every agent and hence θ∗(0) = θ. By contrast,
for λ = λ∗(w), the proposition 1.1 applies for every agent and thus θ∗(λ∗(w)) = θ.
Proof of Proposition 1.5
Proof. I first prove existance and then uniqueness. As proposition 1.3 shows, the economy
can be partitioned into two sets, [θ, θ∗(λ)] and [θ∗(λ), θ]. All agents in the latter set
demand capital equal to (1 + λ)w, and the capital demand of agents in the former set is
characterized by Xj∗(i, θj)1−αi = p(i)αir θ
z−αi
j .
Thus, in order to show that the aggregate capital demand is continuous in r I need
to demonstrate that both θ∗(λ) and Xj∗(i, θj) are continuous in r.
Because αi and p(i) are continuous in i, Xj∗(i, θj) is continuous in r as long as
i(θj) is continuous in r. I know from assumption 1.1 that Xj∗(i, θj) is continuously and
monotonically increasing in i. Because the earnings can be rewritten using the FOC on
capital as
( 1
αi
− 1)rXj∗(i, θj),
the optimal sectoral choice i(θj) is continuous in r.
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Furthermore, the marginal agent θ∗(λ) increases continuously and monotonically
because Xj∗(i, θj) increases continuously and monotonically in i for every agent. Thus,
the aggregate capital demand is continuous in r. Furthermore it monotonically increases
in r.
What remains to be shown is that if lim r → 0(∞), then there is an excess demand
(supply) of capital. The necessary condition on capital implies that capital demand goes
to infinity for lim r → 0. This means that as long as λ > 0, there is an excess demand
for capital in the limit. By contrast, if lim r →∞, then the optimal capital goes to zero,
implying an excess supply for capital. By the mean value theorem, an equilibrium has to
exist.
Uniqueness follows from the fact that the set of constrained agents decreases mono-
tonically in r together with the monotonicity of i(θ) in r.
Proof of Proposition 1.6
Proof. Towards a contradiction suppose that
d
(∫ i
0
∫
θj∈Ωi ϕ(θj)dθjdi
)
dλ
> 0,
for some i. This condition shows that some agents must have resorted into a more labor-
intensive sector with financial development. Yet unconstrained agents do not resort and
constrained agents sort into more capital-intensive sectors. Hence,
d
(∫ i
0
∫
θj∈Ωi
ϕ(θj)dθjdi
)
dλ ≤
0 for all i.
The second part of the proposition is true because for every min{i(θ), i(θ)} < i <
i(θ∗(λ)) and λ < λ∗(w), there is a constrained agent who chooses i before the development
and now chooses some i′ > i.
Proof of Proposition 1.7
Proof. If i(θ) > i(θ), then in the sectors [0, i(θ)) only constrained agents are active.
Because constrained agents sort unambiguously into more capital-intensive sectors, the
first result is immediate.
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If i(θ) < i(θ) and λ < λ∗(w) (not all agents are unconstrained initially), all of
the agents active in sectors [0, i(θ)) are unconstrained and thus sort into more labor-
intensive sectors with financial development. This implies that employment shares in
these labor-intensive sectors rise.
Proof of Proposition 1.8
Proof. For constrained agents, rXj(θj , i, w)−rw = λrw, and thus independent of sectoral
choice. Taking logs of the first term in (1.3) and differentiating with respect to i implies
that the earnings of a financially constrained agent are maximal at
ln θj − lnw − ln(1 + λ) = p
′(i)
p(i)
1
α′(i)
where p′(i) ≡ ∂p(i)∂i and α′(i) ≡ ∂αi∂i . This condition only holds if the agent’s sectoral
choice is in the interior, that is, i(θj) ∈ (0, 1). Then, the difference in talent between two
sectors i and k is
ln θ(i)− ln θ(k) = 1
α′(i)
p′(i)
p(i) −
1
α′(k)
p′(k)
p(k) .
Note that the RHS is a constant and thus does not change with financial development.
Therefore, the LHS has to remain constant. Because every constrained agent sorts into
more capital-intensive sectors with financial development, the talent of the agent active
in sector i has to increase. Thus, θ(i)− θ(k) has to increase with financial development.
For unconstrained agents, rw is independent of sectoral choice. By using the FOC on
capital (1.2), the logarithm and differentiating imply that the necessary condition for the
optimal sectoral choice for unconstrained agents reads as
(z − 1) ln θj − ln r = − ln p(i)− lnαi − 1− αi
α′(i)
p′(i)
p(i) .
Note that this condition coincides with the one for constrained agents when Xj∗(θj) =
(1 + λ)w as (1 − αi) ln(w(1 + λ)) = ln p(i) + lnαi + ln r + (z − αi) ln θj in that case.
Again, this condition does only hold if the agent’s sectoral choice is in the interior, that
is, i(θj) ∈ (0, 1). Now, the difference in the talent sorting into sectors i and k has to be
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equal to
(z−1) ln θ(i)−(z−1) ln θ(k) = 1− αk
α′(k)
p′(k)
p(k) +ln p(k)+lnαk−
1− αi
α′(i)
p′(i)
p(i) − ln p(i)− lnαi
Because unconstrained agents sort into more labor-intensive sectors with financial de-
velopment, the talent of an agent active in sector i also increases in this case. Hence,
θ(i)− θ(k) has to increase with financial development.
As the difference in talent of agents that sort into two sectors i and k increases, the
difference in the sectors that two agents with talent θH and θL sort into has to decrease.
Therefore, between any two agents with talent θj and θl that were both unconstrained
or both constrained before the financial development, sectoral concentration has to
occur.
Proof of Lemma 1.1
Proof. The value output can be split into capital and labor income. The capital payments
r Xj(i, θj , w) include both payments for capital rented on the capital market and possessed
by an agent. In the following, I denote labor payments by
ν(i, θj , w) ≡ p(i) θz−αij (Xj(i, θj , w))αi − r Xj(i, θj , w).
The capital intensity of sector i populated with agent θj is defined as
κ(i, w, λ) ≡ rXj(i, θj(i), w)
p(i) θj(i)z−αi(Xj(i, θj(i), w))αi
.
In general, a sector i is populated by more than one type of agent because the equilibrium
assignment function is non-monotone. Therefore, the inverse of the function is given only
within the sets of agents [θ, θ∗(λ)] and [θ∗(λ), θ], as the assignment is strictly monotone
within both the set of constrained and unconstrained agents. I denote with θ(i) the
multivalued function composed of the two inverse assignment functions i−1(θj) (for the
sets of constrained and unconstrained agents) evaluated at i.
In cases of unconstrained capital allocation and sectoral choice, the labor intensity of
sector i can be written as
ξ(i, w,∞) ≡ 1− κ(i, w,∞) = 1− αi.
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This holds for any agent θ(i) that is unconstrained. Sectors with higher α possess
higher capital intensity in equilibrium. Because the assignment function is monotonically
increasing for unconstrained agents, the more talented agents are active in more capital-
intensive sectors. Empirically, a positive relation between the capital intensity and the
wages exists for the United States.49
By contrast, labor intensity for a constrained agent with talent θj in sector i is
ξ(i, w, 0) = 1− κ(i, w, 0) = 1− r
p(i)θz−1j
(
w(1 + λ)
θj
)1−αi
> 1− αi.
This labor intensity necessarily increases in talent.50 The inequality stems from the fact
that capital intensity in a sector populated by constrained agents is less than optimal.
Since negative assortative matching prevails for constrained agents in equilibrium, the
capital intensity also increases in i for constrained agents.
49See, for example, Slichter (1950) and Sampson (2011).
50If p(i(θj))θz−αi(w(1 + λ))αi were to decrease in talent, this would contradict the agent’s optimal
sectoral choice because the capital payments are constant for constrained agents.
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1.10.2 Theoretical Extension
I extend the model by allowing agents to contract not only capital but also workers. The
reason for this extension is to show that in a reasonable framework, the average wages in
a sector co-move with entrepreneurial talent, and sorting reversals of entrepreneurs to
sectors occur. Hence, it bridges the gap between the analytical part and the empirical
part as I use average sectoral labor earnings in the latter.
Setup. In particular, I use a one-period version of the directed search model by Kaas
and Kircher (2011). The output reads as a simple extension, an entrepreneur j with
talent θj who uses capital X and the amount of labor L produces in sector i:
Yi(θj , X, L) = θz−kj
(
XαiL1−αi
)k
,
with z > 1 and k < 1. Entrepreneurs can post wages in order to attract workers. Higher
wages lead to higher vacancy filling probabilities in equilibrium, but higher pay per
worker. Entrepreneurs face an iso-elastic cost function of vacancy posting, c(v) = 1σvσ.
The borrowing constraint is assumed to only apply to capital and not to labor.
This represents the fact that labor payments, contrary to capital, can be paid ex post.
Furthermore, vacancy costs should be thought of in terms of time spent by the entrepreneur
searching for labor instead of productive activity, as opposed to financial costs.
Workers and Matching Technology. Workers are homogeneous and choose a labor
market characterized by a wage ω. Furthermore, they face the outside option of not
entering any market and earning B. The matching technology in any labor market is
characterized by a Cobb-Douglas matching function. Hence, the amount of matches
formed in a specific labor market is equal to
M(V,U) = V 1−γ Uγ
where V is the amount of vacancies posted in the market, and U is the amount of
unemployed searching in that specific market. I define labor market tightness as ρ ≡ VU ;
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then the vacancy filling probability can be written as q(ρ) = M(V,U)V = ρ−γ .51
From the assumption of the matching technology and worker homogeneity together
with the outside option B, it follows that in any equilibrium
B = ρq(ρ)ω(ρ) = ρ1−γω(ρ).
Workers’ expected earnings have to be equal across the different labor markets. This
links the wage posted with labor market tightness. A higher wage implies that the labor
market is less tight and that the vacancy filling probability is higher.
Entrepreneurs’ Maximization Problem. The maximization problem of the en-
trepreneur now reads as
max
i,Xj ,v,ρ
p(i) θz−kj
(
Xαij
(
ρ−γv
)1−αi)k − rX˜j − 1
σ
vσ − B
ρ
v
s.t.Xj ≤ X˜j + w
X˜j ≤ λw
Xj ≥ 0
where I use the fact that L = q(ρ)v and ω(ρ) = Bρq(ρ) . Again, I disentangle the maxi-
mization problem into two parts. First, I show the maximization decision conditional on
sectoral choice, and then I turn to optimal sectoral choice for constrained and uncon-
strained agents.
The first-order conditions read as follows:
Xj : αikp(i)θz−kj
(
Xαij
(
ρ−γv
)1−αi)k = rXj (1.9)
v : (1− αi)kp(i)θz−kj
(
Xαij
(
ρ−γv
)1−αi)k = vσ + B
ρ
v (1.10)
ρ : (1− αi)kγp(i)θz−kj
(
Xαij
(
ρ−γv
)1−αi)k = B
ρ
v (1.11)
Combining the last two first-order conditions implies that
ρ = B(1− γ)
γvσ−1
.
51Normally, labor market tightness is denoted by θ. Because I have used that variable already for
entrepreneurial talent, I chose ρ instead.
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This equation dictates whether more talented entrepreneurs pay higher or lower wages.
The complementarity between the entrepreneurial talent and labor implies that better
entrepreneurs will post more vacancies. The above equation shows that if and only if
σ > 1 , then the entrepreneurs posting more vacancies choose tighter labor markets, that
is, those with a lower ρ. And from the indifference condition for workers, tighter labor
markets are only sustainable if the offered wage is higher.
The reasoning underlying this result is that with convex vacancy costs, the marginal
cost of a vacancy is higher for more talented entrepreneurs. Therefore, they are willing to
offer higher wages because their return from having a higher vacancy filling probability
is higher compared to less-talented entrepreneurs. Note that this result is independent of
whether entrepreneurs are borrowing constrained or not. In what follows I work with the
assumption that σ > 1.52
Constrained Entrepreneurs. For borrowing constrained entrepreneurs with Xj ≡
X = (1 + λ)w, the vacancies posted as a function of the talent read as
vσ−(1−αi)k−(σ−1)γ(1−αi)k = (1− γ)(1− αi)kp(i)
(
B(1− γ)
γ
)−γ(1−αi)k
θz−kj X
αik.
This function confirms that more talented entrepreneurs post more vacancies as σ − (1−
αi)k − (σ − 1)γ(1− αi)k > 0. The earnings of an entrepreneur with talent θj in sector i
can thus be written as
pi(θj , i) = p(i)
σ
Σi θ
σ(z−k)
Σi
j X
αikσ
Σi [(1−αi)k]
σ−Σi
Σi
(
B
γ
)−γ(1−αi)kσ
Σi (1−γ)
(1−αi)k(1−γ)
Σi
Σi
σ
−rλw
where Σi = σ − (1− αi)k − (σ − 1)γ(1− αi)k.
I prove that NAM prevails between the level of entrepreneurial talent and sectoral
capital intensity by contradiction. Suppose there is a constrained agent with talent θH
who prefers sector i over j with i > j, and at the same time an entrepreneur with talent
θL < θH prefers j over i.
Hence, suppose that
pi(θH , i) > pi(θH , j)
52Empirical estimates of the vacancy costs suggest convexity, see, for example, Cooper et al. (2007).
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and simultaneously
pi(θL, i) < pi(θL, j).
This implies that
θ
σ(z−k)k(1+γ(σ−1))(αj−αi)
ΣiΣj
H > θ
σ(z−k)k(1+γ(σ−1))(αj−αi)
ΣiΣj
L ,
which is a contradiction as αj < αi and θH > θL and σ > 1. Therefore, the sorting
between entrepreneurs and sectoral capital intensity must be characterized by NAM for
financially constrained entrepreneurs.
Unconstrained Entrepreneurs. This is different for unconstrained entrepreneurs.
Combining the first-order conditions implies that(
X∗j
)Σi−αikσ = p(i)σ θσ(z−k)j (αir
)Σi (B
γ
)−γ(1−αi)kσ
kσ (1−αi)σ−Σi (1−γ)(1−αi)k(1−γ).
The necessary and sufficient condition for the capital demand to be over-proportionally
increasing in talent θj is
σ(z − 1) > (1− αi)k(1− γ)(σ − 1).
This condition is for example fulfilled if the production function is assumed to be
Yi(θj , X, L) = θj
(
XαiL1−αi
)k, with k < 1.
The earnings of an unconstrained agent in sector i can be rewritten as
pi(θj , i) =
= (kp(i))
σ
Γi θ
σ(z−k)
Γi
j
(
B
γ
)−γ(1−αi)kσ
Γi (1− γ)
(1−αi)k(1−γ)
Γi (1− αi)
σ−Σi
Γi
(
αi
r
)αikσ
Γi Γi
kσ
.
where Γi = Σi − αikσ. The necessary and sufficient condition for PAM between en-
trepreneurial talent and sectoral capital intensity then is
θ
(αi−αj)(z−k)σ(σ−1)k(1−γ)
(Σi−αikσ)(Σj−αjkσ)
H > θ
(αi−αj)(z−k)σ(σ−1)k(1−γ)
(Σi−αikσ)(Σj−αjkσ)
L ,
for any two agents with θH > θL and for any two sectors i > j. This is always fulfilled as
αi > αj . Thus, for unconstrained entrepreneurs, PAM prevails and the more talented
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entrepreneurs sort into more capital-intensive sectors. Hence, because the wages offered
monotonically increase in entrepreneurial talent, the sorting reversals due to financial
development implies that the alignment of the average sectoral wages with the sectoral
capital-intensity increases.
Chapter 2
Modes of Cooperation -
and the Returns to Talent
In this paper I analyze the consequences of cooperation on inequality. I develop a
heterogeneous agents model distinguishing between two types of cooperation, between-
task and within-task cooperation. The former reflects the chance to assign different
tasks to different agents. The latter represents the reassignment of tasks from one agent
to another if the first agent fails to complete the task. The equilibrium allocation is
analyzed with a particular focus on the sorting of agents into modes of cooperation and
matching between agents. Cooperation increases inequality at the top and decreases
inequality at the bottom of the talent distribution. Within-task cooperation is more
inequality-enhancing than between-task cooperation. This may help explain changes
in income inequality in the wake of the information and communication technology
revolution. Finally, I examine how the talent distribution shapes returns to talent in an
economy. In particular, a wider talent distribution is likely to increase the skill premium.
This sheds some light on differences in the skill premium across countries.
Keywords: Cooperation, Occupational Choice, Wage Differentials, Organization of
the firm.
JEL Classification Number: J24, J3, L2, M5.
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2.1 Introduction
From the first human settlements in around 10, 000 BC to the present day, there has
been a colossal increase in the division of labor. Not only has the range of consumption
goods grown dramatically, but an even larger increase can be observed in the number
of occupations open to people.1 The increase in cooperation between individuals seems
to be one of the most distinct features of progress. Clearly, this raises some research
questions: What are the consequences of cooperation for earnings distribution? How are
earnings likely to evolve over time if cooperation continues to increase? This paper takes
a step towards answering such questions.
One salient difference between Europe and the U.S. is the more dispersed distribution
of talent and the higher skill premium in the U.S. (see Devroye and Freeman (2002),
Leuven et al. (2004)).2 A second focus of the paper is to address the role that cooperation
may play in explaining the larger skill premium in the U.S. in comparison to Europe. In
particular, I find that a more dispersed talent distribution in an economy leads to a higher
skill premium if the skill distribution is sufficiently right-skewed.3 Thus, cooperation
tends to act as a mechanism which amplifies the dispersion of earnings compared to
talent. The reason is that the dispersion in talent affects occupational choice and the
mode of cooperation chosen.
In order to address these research questions, I have developed a heterogeneous agents
model that allows for different types of cooperation. In particular, I extend a version of
the model used in a series of papers by Garicano (2000), and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2004, 2006). In their model agents face one uncertain task and cooperation occurs when
agents unable to perform the task pass it on to other (more skilled) agents. In order to
1As early on as the late eighteenth century the production of a single pin was divided into eighteen
distinct operations (Smith and Garnier (1845)). Levine (2012) mentions that the production of a Boeing
747 requires more than 6,000,000 parts, each involving another series of operations.
2See Leuven et al. (2004) for a discussion of alternative attempts in the literature to explain the more
dispersed earnings distribution in the U.S.
3Devroye and Freeman (2002) find that the difference in the skill premium explains a substantial part
of the difference in earnings dispersion between Europe and the U.S.
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capture the empirical fact that a great deal of cooperation takes place between tasks, I
introduce a second task and allow for both cooperation between tasks and cooperation
within tasks. In production, the overall workload is often bundled into different sets of
tasks. I use the simplifying assumption that it is exactly partitioned into two (sets of)
tasks, one containing tasks that any agent (at least in that line of work) can perform,
and one containing the remaining tasks. Thus, the latter is similar to the one used by
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg.
More specifically, the economy is characterized by a continuum of heterogeneous
agents who differ in a one-dimensional talent measure, i.e. agents can be ranked according
to skill.4 Any completed project can be sold at an exogenous price p and consists of
two tasks A and B. The former requires time but no special knowledge, while the latter
requires both time and expertise. As the task requirement of B is unknown ex-ante,
agents face uncertainty in task B compliance. The two types of cooperation possible are
between-task cooperation, i.e. one agent specializes in carrying out task A, and the other
on performing task B, and within-task cooperation, where agents who fail to perform
task B pass the unfinished product on to more skilled agents who may be able to perform
the task.
While the form of between-task cooperation is rather specific (as task A can be exerted
by any agent), it is an empirically relevant case. In most lines of works a multitude of
tasks requires time but no particular skill beyond the basic skills learnt during training.
For example, many architects employed carry out exclusively standard tasks in projects,
whereas only the partners focus on the more creative and specialized work. The tasks
performed by a nurse are generally time-consuming, but do not require any knowledge
beyond that learnt during training. Running standard regressions every day for a bank is
a job that any economist with a PhD can perform. Similarly, in many jobs people are
exclusively engaged in tasks that are time consuming, but do not require any knowledge
or skill beyond that taught during their initial training.
4I would like to extend this model to allow for both multi-dimensional talent and tasks but this is
beyond the scope of the current paper.
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I characterize the equilibrium, with a specific focus on the matching pattern between
agents and equilibrium sorting into forms of cooperation. In general, cooperation leads
to a decrease in inequality at the bottom of the talent distribution and an increase at
the top. The reason is that cooperation takes place between high-skilled and low-skilled
agents, and both skill groups gain. Thus, the agents who loose in relative terms are those
in the middle of the talent distribution. Still, there are some notable differences between
the consequences of an increase in between-task and within-task cooperation. Increases
in between-task cooperation actually reduce inequality both at the top and the bottom
of the income distribution relative to within-task cooperation. Thus, while cooperation
generally enhances top-income inequality and reduces low-income inequality, within-task
cooperation strengthens the first effect and weakens the latter. Furthermore, in contrast
to between-task cooperation, in within-task cooperation the marginal earnings of an
agent are dependent on the talent of the cooperators.
As mentioned, cooperation can help to explain the higher returns to talent in the U.S.
in comparison to those in Europe. A more dispersed skill distribution implies a higher
skill premium in the presence of cooperation (at least for right-skewed distributions).
Moreover, better information on the difficulty of task B is equivalent to an increase in the
talent dispersion. This may help to explain certain long-term trends in the skill premium.
Related Literature This paper is related to different strands of literature. First, there
is the vast literature on determinants of earnings distribution.5 A great deal of research
focuses on potential explanations for observed earnings differentials. Early studies relating
the earnings and talent distribution via a scale-of-operations or span-of-control effect are
Tuck (1954), Mayer (1960), Lucas Jr. (1978), and Rosen (1982). Yet, in contrast to my
paper they do not internalize the cooperation decision and have no explicit matching
decisions.
There is an extensive literature which tries to explain the evolution of inequality over
5For reviews of alternative theories explaining observed wage differentials see Sattinger (1993) and
Neal and Rosen (2000).
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time. For example, Acemoglu (2003) analyzes the impact of international trade on wage
inequality, both across countries and over time. The extensive literature on the impact of
technological change on the equilibrium distribution of earnings deals with this issue, such
as Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Acemoglu (1998), Galor and Moav (2000), Krusell et al.
(2000), Mobius and Schoenle (1996), Saint-Paul (2001).6 They consider technological
change directly affecting the productivity of agents, whereas I target the effects caused
by the decreasing costs of cooperation in order to focus on the collaboration channel in
explaining changes in income inequalities.
My research also relates to the literature on cross-country differences in skill premia
and wage differentials, and their determinants. Krueger et al. (2010) present an extensive
analysis of the variation between countries when it comes to skill premia. Devroye and
Freeman (2002) and Leuven et al. (2004) address the issue of whether differences in talent
distribution can explain the observed earnings differentials. I show how cooperation plays
a role in explaining these differences.
I also refer to the extensive matching literature starting with the seminal paper by
Becker (1973). Important contributions examining the role of cooperation on earnings
differentials in matching models are Kremer (1993), Kremer and Maskin (1996), and
Legros and Newman (2002). The distinctive element in my model is that cooperation
is a choice variable. Other examples of the growing literature of heterogeneous agent
models with assignment or matching are Grossman and Maggi (2000), Grossman (2004),
and Ohnsorge and Trefler (2007).
In its focus on cooperation among agents the paper is related to the literature on
the theory of the firm. However, this sort of literature focuses more on the structure
of cooperation (within the firm or via the market) and less on whether agents want
to cooperate.7 Most literature on organizational theory focuses on incentive problems
between agents within cooperation.8
6For an overview of the literature on skill-biased technological change see Violante (2008).
7For a review of some of the central theories of the firm see Gibbons (2005).
8For example, Calvo and Wellisz (1978, 1979) and Williamson (1967) develop hierarchical theories of
the firm based on incentives.
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A less extensive strand in the literature focuses on the cognitive limits of agents
as a reason for cooperation. My analysis belongs to this strand of research.9 The
work most closely related to ours is represented by Garicano (2000) and Garicano and
Rossi-Hansberg (2004, 2006).10 They consider a knowledge economy with a distribution
of problems and knowledge among agents. Agents can either draw problems from the
distribution and try to solve them, or they can buy unsolved problems from other agents
and try to resolve them. The latter option has the downside of a lower probability of
success, but the upside of less costly problems (more specifically, in their framework the
latter option allows to try to solve more problems). This form of cooperation is captured
by the within-task cooperation in my model.
In contrast to my work, there is no between-task cooperation as all tasks are equal
ex-ante in their setup. Empirically, part of the tasks necessary in a job are performed
by secretaries, assistants, nurses etc. These tasks do not require any specific knowledge
beyond the general training undertaken in that particular occupation. As these kinds
of tasks play a substantial role in all market segments, an inclusion of this form of
cooperation is necessary in order to assess the effects of cooperation on the distribution
of labor and earnings correctly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2 I present the model
and in 2.3 the agents’ maximization decisions. Section 2.4 defines and characterizes the
competitive equilibrium. Central properties of the equilibrium are discussed in 2.5. I
analyze the consequences of cooperation on inequality in section 2.6. The link between
cooperation, the dispersion of talent and the skill premium are discussed in section 2.7,
and section 2.8 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2.2 Setup
The economy consists of a continuum of income-maximizing agents of measure 1. Agents
need both knowledge and time to perform tasks. They are heterogeneous in knowledge
9For a review of this line of research, see Garicano and Prat (2011).
10Another paper along the same lines is Saint-Paul (2007).
2.2. SETUP 79
t, distributed according to a probability distribution function φ(t) with full support
between t and t.11 The respective c.d.f. is denoted Φ(t), is continuous and increases
strictly monotonically. In turn, agents are homogeneous in both the time required to
perform a task and time endowment. For expositional reasons I assume that each agent
is able to perform at most two tasks per period.
Production. Agents engage in projects and each successfully exhibited project yields
the same value p. It is composed of two project-specific tasks A and B combined via
a Leontief technology.12 Both tasks require time and knowledge. In particular, they
require the same amount of time but differ in difficulty. Task A can be carried out by any
agent, whereas task B is characterized by an idiosyncratic difficulty draw q distributed
according to a continuous and strictly monotonically increasing cumulative distribution
function Ψ(q), with the p.d.f. denoted ψ(q). Only agents with t ≥ q can complete their
tasks successfully. Thus, each agent faces an ex-ante probability of accomplishing task B
equal to Ψ(t). It also implies that agents can be ranked by talent, i.e. agents with t > t′
can carry out any task an agent with talent t′ can complete.
It is important to note that tasks A and B are project-specific. Agents cannot
simply assemble any successfully performed task A and B to final projects, but both
project-specific tasks must be carried out to complete the project.13
Furthermore, agents only realize whether they are able to perform a project-specific
task B once they start such a task. Therefore, irrespective of compliance, each agent can
try to perform at most two tasks.
Cooperation. I turn now to the cooperation possibilities among agents. First, all
agents can choose to work alone and try to carry out both tasks themselves. I refer to
these agents as autarkic (A). Moreover, agents can pay some fixed costs of cooperation
and choose to collaborate with other agents. These fixed costs incorporate search and
11I use the terms talent, skill, knowledge, and expertise interchangeably throughout.
12One can also think of two sets of tasks A and B.
13The word “project” is a general term denoting services, goods production, etc.
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matching costs, as well as other cooperation-specific transaction costs, such as contracting
costs or potential legal costs. In particular, two forms of cooperation are possible:
between-task cooperation and within-task cooperation.14
I should mention briefly that I do not take issues of financial liability into account. I
assume that any fixed costs or remuneration payments can be afforded irrespective of the
success or failure of a project.
Between-task Cooperation. Between-task cooperation allows agents to share the
workload ex-ante, before knowing the difficulty of the project. In particular, at a fixed
cost ca, two agents can specialize in different tasks and assemble exerted project-specific
tasks A and B afterwards. It is clear that there will always be one agent who specializes
exclusively in production of task A and another who performs task B. Henceforth, I
label agents specializing in task A production workers (W), and those who specializing
in task B production entrepreneurs (E).
Within-task Cooperation. By contrast, within-task cooperation allows agents to
pass on any task that is not completed successfully by one agent to be performed by
another agent. More specifically, a fixed cost cp is required to pass on an unfinished
project, including a failed task B and completed task A, to another agent. I assume
that an unfinished task can only be passed on to another agent once.15 The likelihood of
successful task completion is lower for tasks that are passed on. However, the performed
project-specific task A implies that agents can acquire two unfinished projects. Agents
who only acquire unfinished projects, i.e. those where other agents have failed in task B
production, are referred to as consultants (C), and agents who sell their projects after
failure to complete them are indicated by a subscript c (e.g. Ac or Ec). Clearly, agents
14Alternative labels are ex-ante and ex-post cooperation to highlight that some forms of cooperation
are created before any information on task difficulty is revealed and other forms are created afterwards.
These labels also indicate the relatively long-term relationship of between-task cooperation.
15This simplifies the analysis. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) demonstrate that the qualitative
results do not change when unfinished tasks are passed on several times.
2.3. THE AGENT’S MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM. 81
may also engage in both types of cooperation.
Timing The timing of the production process takes the following form:
1. Cooperations are formed.
2. Assignment of tasks in between-task cooperation.
3. Idiosyncratic difficulty draws q.
4. All assigned tasks are attempted (and completed where possible).
5. Reallocation of tasks in within-task cooperation.
6. Reallocated tasks are attempted (and completed where possible).
7. Final projects are assembled and sold.
2.3 The Agent’s Maximization Problem.
Agents choose the occupation that maximizes their earnings. In this model, occupational
choice refers to whether an agent wants to cooperate and, conditional on cooperation,
what role she wants to carry out within the cooperation, and with whom she wants to
cooperate.
I assume that entrepreneurs and consultants choose with whom to cooperate.16 The
analysis is separated into maximization decisions for entrepreneurs and consultants and
occupational choice decisions of agents.
The Entrepreneur’s Maximization Problem. Agents who participate in between-
task cooperation have to choose with whom to cooperate and how to distribute the tasks.
As any agent can perform task A, the less talented agents in such a cooperation are
16This assumption is without loss of generality, i.e. both the matching and pay-off pattern are the same
when workers and agents selling unfinished projects make the decision. This follows from the uniqueness
of the competitive equilibrium, to be proven below (see proposition 2.4).
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assigned these tasks in order to increase the likelihood of success. Furthermore, the
amount of tasks A executed equals that of tasks B attempted due to the project-specificity
of tasks.
Thus, entrepreneurs choose the worker with talent s to maximize their earnings piE(t),
i.e.
piE(t) = max
s
2 pΨ(t)− w(s)− ca. (2.1)
As any worker is able to carry out task A, entrepreneurs choose the worker who accepts
the lowest wage w(s). In equilibrium a flat wage w always prevails.
The Consultant’s Maximization Problem. Agents who participate in within-task
cooperation have to choose on which side of the bargain they want to be. Clearly, all
autarkic agents and entrepreneurs are willing to sell their unfinished projects (in case of
failure) as long as they receive a positive price, and sell to the consultant offering the
highest price. In turn, agents who buy unfinished projects have to choose which agent to
buy from. Their earnings can be written as
piC(t) = max
s
2 pPr(q ≤ t|q > s)− 2 cp − 2 r(s), (2.2)
where s indicates the talent of the seller. The price an agent with talent s receives for
selling her unfinished project is labeled r(s). The conditional probability of success can
be rewritten as
Pr(t ≥ q|q > s) = Ψ(t)−Ψ(s)1−Ψ(s) ,
if t ≥ s. Clearly, consultants are more talented than the agents they buy from, as they
would otherwise not face a positive success probability. This leads to the following
optimality condition:
p
ψ(s)(Ψ(t)− 1)
(1−Ψ(s))2 = r
′(s). (2.3)
ψ(s) is the marginal increase in the probability of success at point s. The marginal price
for an unfinished project equals the marginal return it provides. As Ψ(t) is bounded above
by 1 the price r(s) decreases in s. This means that ceteris paribus consultants prefer to
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buy projects from less-skilled agents, since this increases their conditional probability of
success.
The marginal price depends not only on the talent of the agent selling the unfinished
project but also on the talent of the agent buying it, as the conditional probability of
success depends on both agents’ talent in a non-separable way. Indeed, the equilibrium
price function r(s) depends on the whole distribution of talent.17
Note that the maximization problem for consultants is independent of whether the
seller is an entrepreneur or an autarkic agent as both payment and fixed costs occur per
project and not per cooperator.
Occupational Choice An agent with talent t chooses the occupation that maximizes
her payoff. Her earnings are thus
ω(t) ≡ max{piW (t);piAc(t);piA(t);piEc(t);piE(t);piC(t)}. (2.4)
Agents who take part in cooperation must also choose with whom to cooperate as discussed
above. I suppress this dependence here for notational convenience. The earnings in the
respective occupations are as follows:
piW (t) =w(t); (2.5)
piAc(t) =pΨ(t) + (1−Ψ(t)) r(t); (2.6)
piA(t) =pΨ(t); (2.7)
piEc(t) =2 pΨ(t) + 2 (1−Ψ(t)) r(t)− ca − w(s); (2.8)
piE(t) =2 pΨ(t)− ca − w(s); (2.9)
piC(t) =2 p
Ψ(t)−Ψ(s)
1−Ψ(s) − 2 cp − 2 r(s). (2.10)
2.4 Market Clearing and Competitive Equilibrium
Before I turn to the definition of a competitive equilibrium in this model, I will discuss the
markets that have to clear. In particular, the supply of workers or unfinished projects has
17When it does not cause any confusion, I suppress the dependence for notational convenience.
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to equal the demand for workers or unfinished projects by entrepreneurs and consultants.
Labor Market Clearing. Let AW denote the set of workers and AET ≡ AE ∪ AEc
the set of all entrepreneurs. The latter also incorporates entrepreneurs who engage
in within-task cooperation and sell their unfinished projects. I denote with e(t) the
entrepreneur matched to a worker of talent t. The labor market clears if for every t ∈ AW∫
[0,t]∩AW
φ(t′)dt′ =
∫
[e(0),e(t)]∩A
ET
φ(t′)dt′. (2.11)
The left-hand side presents the supply of workers and the right-hand side gives the
corresponding demand by entrepreneurs.
In the notation above I assume implicitly positive assortative matching. In section
2.5.1 I demonstrate that matching between workers and entrepreneurs is indeterminate
and hence this assumption is w.l.o.g.
Task Market Clearing. Similarly, the supply of unfinished projects has to equal its
demand at any point. Let AAc denote the set of autarkic agents who cooperate within-
tasks and AEc the set of entrepreneurs who engage in within-task cooperation. Similarly,
the set of consultants who purchase unfinished projects from autarkic agents is denoted
ACA and that of consultants who purchase from entrepreneurs ACE . Furthermore, the
consultant matched with an agent with talent t is labeled cA(t) if the agent is autarkic
and cE(t) if she is an entrepreneur.18 For the markets of uncompleted tasks B to clear
at any point, it is necessary that for every t ∈ AAc∫
[0,t]∩AAc
(1−Ψ(t′))φ(t′)dt′ =
∫
[cA(0),cA(t)]∩ACA
2φ(t′)dt′ (2.12)
and for every t ∈ AEc∫
[0,t]∩AEc
2 (1−Ψ(t′))φ(t′)dt′ =
∫
[cE(0),cE(t)]∩ACE
2φ(t′)dt′. (2.13)
The left-hand sides of equations (2.12) and (2.13) are the supply of unfinished tasks B
of autarkic agents and entrepreneurs, respectively. Note that the latter have twice the
18Note that AA denotes the set of autarkic agents and AC the joint set of all consultants.
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probability of failure since they are assigned task B twice. The right-hand sides represent
the demand for unfinished projects by consultants, each of whom demands two unfinished
tasks.
In the above formulation I implicitly assume positive assortative matching. This is
proven to hold in any equilibrium in section 2.5.1.
Competitive Equilibrium I am now able to define the notion of a competitive
equilibrium in this economy as
• a collection of occupational sets, AW , AAc , AA, AEc , AE , ACA and ACE ,
• an earnings function, ω(t) : [t, t]→ R+,19
• assignment functions, e(t) : AW → AE , cA(t) : AAc → ACA and cE(t) : AEc →
ACE ,
such that:
1. Agents choose occupations to maximize earnings, (2.4).
2. Entrepreneurs and consultants choose cooperators in order to maximize their
profits, (2.1) and (2.2).
3. Labor and Task markets clear, (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13).20
2.5 Equilibrium Properties
I now turn to some central properties of equilibrium. First, I establish the matching
pattern between agents (workers and entrepreneurs as well as unfinished projects and
consultants) that prevails in any equilibrium, together with the equilibrium price functions
w(t) and r(t). Then, the sorting pattern of agents into occupations is analyzed and the
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation are established.
19The earnings function depends on the two price functions, w(t) and r(t). Hence I can replace the
earnings function with those functions embedded in it.
20Note that some occupational sets may be empty in equilibrium, depending on the exogenous
parameters. In this case the labor or task markets may not exist.
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2.5.1 Matching
Recall that there is 1 : 1 matching between workers and entrepreneurs in between-task
cooperation, and workers only perform task A. As any agent assigned to this task is sure
to complete it, there is a flat wage among workers. Furthermore, entrepreneurial earnings
do not depend on the talent of the worker and therefore the explicit matching pattern
between workers and entrepreneurs is indeterminate. These results are summarized as
follows:
Proposition 2.1. Workers earn a flat wage w(t) = w > 0. Matching between workers
and entrepreneurs is indeterminate.
While matching between workers and entrepreneurs is indeterminate, there is a
clear matching pattern between unfinished projects and consultants. Ceteris paribus all
consultants prefer to buy unfinished projects from less talented agents as this increases
their conditional likelihood of success. Therefore, market clearing for unfinished projects
implies that the price function r(t) decreases monotonically.
The decrease in conditional success probability due to an increase in the expected
difficulty of the unfinished project is greater for less talented consultants. Therefore, less
talented consultants are willing to pay more in order to obtain projects that are expected
to be easier than more talented consultants. This implies that any equilibrium displays
positive assortative matching. More talented agents pass their unfinished tasks to more
talented consultants. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2. For any positive price r(t) > 0 for unfinished projects holds that
∂r(t)
∂t < 0. Any equilibrium assignment exhibits positive assortative matching between the
sets AAc and ACA (and also between AEc and ACE).
Given that result I directly obtain the assignment function via
∂cA(t)
∂t
= 1−Ψ(t)2
φ(t)
φ(cA(t))
, (2.14)
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by deriving the task market clearing condition. In the same way,
∂cE(t)
∂t
= (1−Ψ(t)) φ(t)
φ(cE(t))
.21 (2.15)
These differential equations together with the boundaries of the occupational sets deter-
mine equilibrium assignment. I denote the boundary between set Ai and Aj as tij , e.g.
tAE denotes the cut-off between autarkic agents and entrepreneurs. Note that there is
n(t) : 1 matching on the market for unfinished projects, with n(t) = 21−Ψ(t) for autarkic
agents and n(t) = 11−Ψ(t) for entrepreneurs.
2.5.2 Earnings
Before I go on to describe equilibrium sorting, I need to discuss a few properties of
any equilibrium earnings function. As discussed, a flat wage w and a continuously
and decreasing price function r(t) for unfinished projects prevails in any equilibrium.
Together with the fact that both the probability of success Ψ(t) and the c.d.f. Φ(t) increase
continuously and monotonically in talent, this implies that earnings are a continuous and
monotonically increasing function in talent. This is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. In any equilibrium, the earnings function ω(t) is continuous and increases
monotonically in t.
2.5.3 Sorting into Occupations
Turning to the equilibrium sorting of agents into occupations an initial result is that
not all occupational sets have to be non-empty in equilibrium. Depending on both the
distribution of talent and task difficulty, along with cooperation costs, some form(s) of
cooperation may not occur in equilibrium. This leads to empty occupational sets. Second,
not all occupational sets can co-exist in equilibrium. In particular, one of the sets AA
and AEC has to be empty. If there are autarkic agents in equilibrium for which the price
of selling the unfinished projects is non-positive, there cannot be any entrepreneur facing
21We also need the occupational sets to be convex for these equations to hold for any t. This is proven
below, see (2.5.3).
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a positive price r(t), and vice versa. Which of the sets (if any) is non-empty depends on
the parameters of the model.
Any equilibrium displays occupational stratification, i.e. occupations form convex
sets. In Kremer and Maskin (1996) and Legros and Newman (2002) non-convex occu-
pational sets may prevail due to complementarities in production. The specific form
of complementarity considered in this model does not allow for this. The equilibrium
displays a clear ordering of the occupational sets by talent. The following proposition
summarizes these results.
Proposition 2.3. Any equilibrium is characterized by occupational stratification, i.e.
occupational sets are convex. Ranking agents from low to high, the occupational sets can
be ranked in the ordering AW , AAc, AA, AEC , AE, ACA and ACE . The lowest talented
agents remain workers while the most talented become consultants. The two sets AA and
AEC are mutually exclusive and not all other occupational sets have to be non-empty in
equilibrium.
Thus, assignment can be completely characterized by cut-off agents tij together with
the differential equations derived from the market clearing conditions above (see 2.5.1).
2.5.4 Existence and Uniqueness
Up to this point I have characterized properties of any potential equilibrium without
reference to whether existence and uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium is guaranteed.
Indeed, for any set of parameters, there is always a unique equilibrium allocation
characterized by a set of cut-offs tWAc , tAcA, tAEc , tEcE , tECA , and tCACE . If tij = tjk,
the occupational set Aj is empty.
Proposition 2.4. For any set of parameters there is always a unique competitive equi-
librium allocation.
The proof is divided into several parts. First, I partition the parameter space and
show that for each set of parameters only one candidate equilibrium type - defined as
the set of non-empty occupational sets - remains, and then continue to show that this
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candidate equilibrium does indeed exist and is also unique. In particular, there is only
one combination of prices r0 and w that clears both the labor and task market and
satisfies agents’ earnings maximizing occupational choice.22
Different economies are likely to be characterized by different equilibrium types,
depending on the distribution of talent and the difficulty of tasks, as well as the value of
the projects p and the cost of cooperation ca and cp.
2.6 Cooperation and Earnings Inequality
The increase in collaboration between agents in production over time is an undisputed
consequence of progress and specialization. Technological progress facilitates cooperation
and thus reduces cooperation costs over time. This is in line with the empirical fact
that average firm size increases over time.23 However, not all technological developments
benefit both modes of cooperation in the same way. For example, the standardization of
production processes facilitated the separation of overall workload into different tasks,
and thus constitutes a reduction in the costs of between-task cooperation, ca. By contrast,
the availability of internet and online searching mechanisms facilitated the search for
experts and thus reduced the cooperation costs between buyers and sellers of unfinished
projects, cp.24 As increases in the two types of cooperation have different consequences for
earnings inequality, it is important to distinguish between them and to assess empirically
which type of cooperation benefited most from a particular technological improvement or
policy reform.
22Recall that the price r0 together with the cut-off talents between occupational sets and consultants’
necessary condition implies a unique matching pattern and equilibrium earnings r(t).
23See Poschke (2014) for a summary on the empirical evidence of increasing average firm size over
time. He also provides evidence that the number of entrepreneurs and self-employed decreases over time
consistent with my model.
24Clearly, many technological developments cause a decrease in overall cooperation costs. Yet they
almost always benefit one type of cooperation more than another. For example, online search mechanisms
particularly facilitated short-term labor contracts. As within-task cooperation is more characterized by
short-term labor contracts, this mode of cooperation benefited particularly from the IT revolution.
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In general, cooperation leads to an increase in high-income inequality (between the
90%- and 50%-percentile) and a decrease in low-income inequality (between the 50%-
and 10%-percentile) compared to cases where there is no cooperation. Yet, considering
these two different types of cooperation implies additional results. In particular, while
reductions in cp increase both inequality among highly-talented and less talented agents,
drops in ca actually reduce inequality among those two groups of agents when both
modes of cooperation are present. In general, within-task cooperation is more inequality-
enhancing than between-task cooperation. This helps explain why there has been a
increase in inequality attributed to the increase in information and communication
technology in recent years (see e.g. Michaels et al. (2014)). They found that information
and communication technologies (ICT) led to a polarization of markets, increasing demand
for low-skilled and high-skilled agents at the expense of those with an intermediate level
of talent.
Turning to the analysis of the effect of cooperation on equilibrium earnings inequality
I consider both discrete and marginal changes in cooperation costs and analyze the
differences and similarities between the two modes of cooperation as regards earnings
inequality. First, I compare the earnings distribution where cooperation costs are
prohibitively high with a situation where lower cooperation costs allow two-thirds of
the population engage in cooperation. Then, I consider in turn the effects of marginal
decreases in cooperation costs on sorting and earnings for the scenarios that either one
or both modes of cooperation prevail in equilibrium.25
Before discussing the consequences of decreased cooperation costs on the earnings
distribution, I need to define the three different concepts of inequality used in my model.
Definition 2.1. I define low-income (high-income) inequality in this model as the earnings
ratio between the 50%-percentile and 10%-percentile (90%- and 50%-percentile) of the
income distribution.
An increase (decrease) in within occupational group inequality is defined as an increase
25I exclude the case where no cooperation takes place in equilibrium as any marginal change in
cooperation costs has no consequence on occupational choice in that scenario.
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(decrease) in the marginal earnings of agents in an occupational set, i.e. an increase
(decrease) in pi′i(t) for all t ∈ Ai.
In this framework, cooperation is primarily between agents with high and low levels of
knowledge. I therefore use the concepts of low-income and high-income inequality in order
to analyze the evolution of earnings differentials between agents who cooperate and agents
who do not. Thus, I always consider scenarios that imply that both the 90%-percentile
and the 10%-percentile of the talent distribution are engaged in cooperation. The issue
which agents, high-skilled or low-skilled, benefit more from cooperation is discussed
briefly the Appendix (see 2.9.2).
Note that both the equilibrium allocation and earnings depend exclusively on the
distribution of “effective” talent, i.e. the distribution of success probability Ψ(t) in the
economy. It can be written as G(x) ≡ Φ(Ψ−1(x)) for x ∈ [0, 1]. The marginal distribution
of “effective” talent is therefore given by g(x) ≡ ∂G(x)∂x = φ(x)ψ(x) .26
2.6.1 Discrete Changes
Highly talented agents benefit most from assigning relatively simple tasks to other agents
in order to use their high levels of talent most efficiently, and low-skilled agents are the
first to accept these assigned simpler tasks. Therefore, the first agents to engage in
cooperation are the least talented and the most talented individuals. Agents engaged in
cooperation always form convex sets at the bottom and top of the talent distribution.27
Cooperation affects earnings of highly talented and less talented agents differently.
The talent of the most talented agents is leveraged on the whole organization and therefore
the marginal returns to talent increases for these agents. By contrast, the talent of
low-skilled agents matters less for output within cooperation and therefore the marginal
returns to talent decrease for them. In the extreme case of between-task cooperation,
26In the following, I use the terms “effective” talent and talent interchangeably when it does not cause
any confusion.
27Note that this stark result depends on the specific structure of task A. If there is also a degree of
uncertainty in task A the first agents to engage in between-task cooperation may not be the most skilled
and least-skilled agents (see Legros and Newman (2002)).
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output is independent of the talent of workers and hence marginal returns to talent of
low-skilled agents are 0.
Therefore, cooperation reduces the earnings inequality among low-skilled agents and
increases inequality among highly talented individuals. These results are summarized in
the proposition below.
Proposition 2.5. Cooperation reduces low-income inequality and increases high-income
inequality. The marginal returns to talent are greater in within-task cooperation than in
between-task cooperation.
The second part of the proposition holds for both the agents at the top and bottom
set of the talent distribution who are engaged in cooperation. Inequality is larger within
the set AC than within AE , and it is also larger within AAc than within AW . Therefore,
inequality in general is larger due to within-task cooperation.28
Figure 2.1 depicts the change in earnings due to cooperation for a log-normal “effective”
talent distribution. The dashed line represents expected earnings as a function of talent
if no cooperation occurs. The price p is set at 1 and hence all agents earn on expectation
their success probability in task B, Ψ(t). Agents can always remain autarkic and thus
Ψ(t) represents agents’ outside option. Hence, any agent engaged in cooperation earns
more than she did as an autarkic agent.
The other graphs depict earnings when either one of the two type types of cooperation
is feasible.29 In both scenarios, the costs of cooperation are such that one third of agents
remains autarkic. The agents most reluctant to enter any form of cooperation are those
with intermediate levels of talent. They are not sufficiently talented to contract workers
or to purchase unfinished projects, and they are also too expensive to contract as workers
and too talented to buy their unfinished projects.30 Therefore, high-skilled and low-skilled
28Yet, as within-task cooperation is characterized by n : 1 matching there are more less talented
individuals entering into cooperation for each highly talented individual in within-task cooperation than
in between-task cooperation. Therefore, within-task cooperation concentrates the gains from cooperation
on a few extremely talented agents.
29I exclude the case where both modes of cooperation prevail for better visibility.
30Depending on the parameters it may be the case that all agents are engaged in some form of
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Figure 2.1: Change in Earnings due to Cooperation (log-normal talent distribution)
agents gain from cooperation relative to agents with intermediate levels of talent.
As mentioned, if only between-task cooperation occurs (the black line) earnings
display lower marginal returns to talent for both highly talented and less talented agents
compared to the scenario when equilibrium is characterized by within-task cooperation
(the grey line). That implies that the inequality both among high-skilled and low-skilled
agents is lower with between-task than within-task cooperation.
2.6.2 Marginal Changes in Cooperation Costs
Turning to the discussion of the effects of a marginal reduction in cooperation costs on
sorting and inequality when some cooperation is already in place, I analyze the cases
where one type of cooperation and both modes of cooperation are in place. While I focus
on analytical results in the first part, in the latter part I mainly provide simulation results
as some consequences of cost reductions are ambiguous when both modes of cooperation
are present.
cooperation.
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One Type of Cooperation Suppose only one type of cooperation prevails in equilib-
rium.31 Clearly, only marginal reductions in cooperation costs for the mode of cooperation
present in equilibrium affect sorting and earnings. A decrease in ca (cp) causes more agents
to engage in cooperation and both sets AW and AE (AAc and AC) necessarily increase,
whereas the occupational set AA decreases.32 The earnings of agents in cooperation
increase, while earnings of autarkic agents remain unaffected.
Thus, autarkic agents loose relative to other occupations. As these agents are located
at the center of the earnings distribution, reductions in cooperation costs generally imply
that low-income inequality decreases while high-income inequality increases.33
As the marginal earnings of workers and entrepreneurs do not depend on their match,
within occupational group inequality for these sets does not depend on cooperation costs.
By contrast, the marginal earnings of both consultants and autarkic agents engaged in
within-task cooperation do depend on the respective match. Therefore, any change in the
matching pattern affects inequality within these occupational groups. More specifically,
within occupational group inequality increases in AAc and AC if and only if the talent of
the match increases. Reductions in cp cause any agent in AC (AAc) to be matched with
a more (less) talented agent in AAc (AC). Hence, within-group inequality increases for
consultants and decreases for agents in AAc due to a drop in cp.34
The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 2.6.
31A sufficient condition for exclusively between-task cooperation occurring in equilibrium is pΨ(t) >
pΨ(t) + ca and 2p Ψ(t)−Ψ(t)1−Ψ(t) − pΨ(t) < 2cp. The analog condition for within-task cooperation as the only
mode of cooperation in equilibrium is pΨ(t) < pΨ(t) + ca and 2p Ψ(t)−Ψ(t)1−Ψ(t) − pΨ(t) > 2cp.
32A special case is one where all agents are already engaged in within-task cooperation. In this case a
reduction in cooperation costs does not alter any occupational sets.
33An exception is where all agents are engaged in within-task cooperation. Then, sorting is unaffected
by a change in cooperation costs, and any reduction in cp is equally shared among all agents. This implies
that both low-income and high-income inequality decreases in that particular case.
34Here too, the case that all agents are engaged in within-task cooperation is an exception. As the
match is not affected by a change in cooperation costs in that scenario, within occupational group
inequality does not change.
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• Low-income inequality decreases due to a reduction in cooperation costs.
• High-income inequality increases due to a reduction in cooperation costs.
• Within occupational group inequality is constant in the sets AW , AA, and AC .
Reductions in cp increase inequality within the set AC and reduce inequality within
the set AAc.
Note that the result that inequality within the sets AW and AE is unaffected by
changes in cooperation costs is a consequence of the fact that compliance is independent of
talent in task A. If this were not the case, within occupational group inequality would also
depend on the costs of cooperation for between-task cooperation. How it would change
in response to reductions in ca depends crucially on the equilibrium matching function,
which can be a rather complicated function as shown in Legros and Newman (2002).
Nevertheless, this specific case is economically relevant in a great many occupations.
I have not yet mentioned any results with respect to the evolution of the inequality
between the 90%-percentile and 10%-percentile. Which agents in cooperation profit more
from a drop in cooperation costs depends heavily on the “effective” distribution of talent.
In particular, the more right-skewed the distribution, the larger the share of earnings that
goes to more highly talented agents. This is a straightforward consequence of relative
supply and demand.35
An important difference between reductions in ca and cp is that the former always
imply an increase in aggregate output. Between-task cooperation produces on expectation
more output than its separate individuals as autarkic agents. By contrast, reductions in
cp do not necessarily produce an increase in aggregate output. This is because consultants
reduce the likelihood of unfinished projects at the expense of fewer projects initiated.
Both Cooperation Forms Occur. Most of the results from the above discussion
carry over when both modes of cooperation prevail. I therefore focus on the additional
35In the Appendix, I derive the marginal effects on w and r0 and discuss this in more depth.
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features when both cooperation types occur and the differences between reductions in
ca and cp when it comes to inequality, and provide simulation results to illustrate these
results graphically.
First, the earnings of all agents cooperating are affected by any decrease in cooperation
costs due to general equilibrium effects. Yet, earnings change more in the occupational
sets directly affected (e.g. AW and AE if ca drops) than in those affected via general
equilibrium effects (AAc and AC if ca falls). Therefore, inequality among high-skilled
agents decreases when ca falls as entrepreneurs gain relative to consultants. Conversely,
it increases when cp falls as consultants gain relative to entrepreneurs, and within-group
inequality increases in AC . Similarly, inequality among less talented agents decreases
when ca falls as workers gain relative to agents in AAc , and increases when cp falls. Thus,
inequality increases (more) due to a decrease in cp than ca.
Furthermore, reductions in ca now affect also inequality within occupational sets,
but only within AAc and AC due to general equilibrium effects. Simulation results
indicate that for most parameter sets earnings for consultants increase and inequality
within this set decreases while inequality increases within AAc and all agents in that set
loose. The reason is that entrepreneurs demand less low-skilled labor than consultants
do. In particular, each entrepreneurs demands one worker while consultants demand on
expectation n(t) = 2/(1−Ψ(c−1(t))) low-skilled labor. Therefore, a drop in ca implies less
demand for low-skilled labor and therefore increases consultants’ earnings at the expense
of agents in AAc due to general equilibrium effects. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 display this fact
for both a normal and a log-normal distribution. The solid lines indicate earnings for
high costs ca and the dashed lines earnings for low between-task cooperation costs. Still,
in both cases the earnings of agents in between-task cooperations increase relative to
those in within-task cooperation, and hence inequality falls both among low-talented and
high-talented agents.
By contrast, earnings of workers tend to always increase due to a drop in cp. Again,
the reason is that each consultant demands more low-skilled agents than an entrepreneur
(n(t) = 2/(1−Ψ(c−1(t))) versus 1). Therefore, both w and r0 increase in order to satisfy
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Figure 2.2: Change in between task cooperation cost for a normal talent distribution
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Figure 2.3: Change in between task cooperation cost for a log-normal talent distribution
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Figure 2.4: Change in within task cooperation cost for a uniform talent distribution
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Figure 2.5: Change in within task cooperation cost for a log-normal talent distribution
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the increasing demand for low-skilled labor in equilibrium. Still, earnings for agents
in AAc increase more than in AW . Therefore, inequality among less talented agents
raises. As entrepreneurs loose, inequality among highly talented agents spikes as cp falls.
Thus, drops in within-task cooperation lead to higher levels of inequality compared to
reductions in between-task cooperation, particularly among high-skilled agents. Figures
2.4 and 2.5 depict those results graphically for both a uniform and log-normal talent
distribution. Income inequality among high-skilled agents increases both due to the
decrease in earnings for entrepreneurs and the increase in within group inequality for
consultants.
2.7 Information Structure, Dispersion of Talent and Re-
turns to Talent
The distribution of skills is more dispersed in the U.S. than in most European countries
(see, for example, Grossman and Maggi (2000) and Devroye and Freeman (2002)).
Furthermore, the U.S. not only has a more dispersed earnings distribution, but also
a higher skill premium. Devroye and Freeman (2002) argue that a large part of the
difference in earnings is due to the fact that the skill premium is larger in the U.S. In
what follows, I discuss whether cooperation can increase the skill premium in the more
dispersed country in terms of talent.36
More specifically, I analyze the effect of changes in the higher moments on the returns
to talent, due to cooperation. Without cooperation, the earnings function would be
independent of the talent distribution. I focus on both the second and third moment of
the talent distribution (dispersion and skewness). I find that a larger dispersion in talent
can lead to a higher skill premium, consistent with the fact that the skill premium in U.S.
is larger than in Europe.37 This result depends on a positive third moment. In general,
36When discussing the dispersion of skills, I refer mainly to the dispersion in educational outcomes.
This does not only depend on the distribution of innate ability, but is also heavily influenced by social
and monetary inequality, and by educational policy.
37See Krueger et al. (2010) for an extensive discussion on cross-country differences in skill premia and
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increases in the skewness of the talent distribution lead to higher returns to earnings.
As mentioned, both the equilibrium allocation and earnings depend exclusively on
the distribution of “effective” talent (success probability ), written as G(x) ≡ Φ(Ψ−1(x))
for x ∈ [0, 1] with the marginal distribution denoted g(x) ≡ ∂G(x)∂x = φ(x)ψ(x) . Any pair of
distributions Φ and Ψ implies the same equilibrium allocation and earnings as another
pair Φ∗ and Ψ∗ if
Φ(Ψ−1(x)) = Φ∗((Ψ∗)−1(x)) ∀x ∈ [0, 1].
This implies that there is an inherent relationship between the distributions of talent
and task difficulty. In other words, any change in the distribution of task difficulty has a
mirrored change in the talent distribution that has exactly the same effects.
2.7.1 The Information Structure and Talent Distribution.
The information structure of task A is fixed, i.e. all agents are able to perform it. Instead,
consider a change in the information structure of task B. Suppose that the expectation
of task difficulty does not alter, but the variance alters. More specifically, consider a
change from distribution Ψ to Ψ∗ such that Ψ∗ second-order stochastically dominates Ψ,
i.e. ∫ t
0
Ψ∗(s)ds ≤
∫ t
0
Ψ(s)ds ∀t,
with
∫ t
0 Ψ∗(s)ds <
∫ t
0 Ψ(s)ds for some t. This can be interpreted as the economy possessing
better information of the difficulty of task B under distribution Ψ∗ than under Ψ. The
success probability for less talented agents is lower under Ψ∗ than under Ψ, while the
reverse holds true for highly talented agents. Thus, a better information structure is
equivalent to a more dispersed talent distribution.
Similarly, an increase in the skewness of the talent distribution is equivalent to a
decrease in the skewness of the distribution of task difficulty. Hence, the effect of an
increase in difficult problems (which implies a decrease in the skewness) is equal to the
effect of an increase in the skewness of the talent distribution. This relates my paper to
earnings distribution.
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the extensive research on the education race between high-skill demand and skill supply.38
2.7.2 Talent Distribution and Returns to Talent.
Here I discuss the effects of a more dispersed “effective” talent distribution, i.e. the
distribution of success probability, on both the equilibrium allocation and earnings. The
question is whether and under what conditions a more dispersed talent distribution implies
higher returns to talent, i.e. a higher skill premium. The skewness of the distribution
is vitally important for the consequences of a more dispersed talent distribution on
the skill premium, and the discussion therefore distinguishes between a symmetric and
right-skewed talent distribution. I will give conditions under which the more dispersed
distribution of success probability gives rise to a higher skill premium, and I provide
simulation results to illustrate my findings.
Symmetric Talent Distribution. First, consider a change in a normal success prob-
ability distribution function from G(x) to H(x) that leaves the mean unaffected but
increases the variance.39
If only between-task cooperation occurs in equilibrium, what matters for the skill
premium is whether the set of entrepreneurs increases relative to the set of workers. I define
xij ≡ x(tij), i.e. the success probability of the agent who is indifferent between occupations
i and j in equilibrium when the distribution function is G(x). If H(xWA) > 1−H(xAE),
the relative supply of workers increases and causes the skill premium to rise. The reverse
occurs if H(xWA) < 1−H(xAE). The demand for workers increases more than its supply,
causing a higher equilibrium wage and a decrease in the skill premium. If the talent
distribution is symmetric, H(xWA) = 1 −H(xAE) as there is 1 : 1 matching between
entrepreneurs and workers, and they form convex sets at the top and bottom of the
talent distribution, respectively. Hence, relative labor demand remains constant and the
earnings function and skill premium are not affected. However, a larger variance implies
38For an overview of this literature see Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
39In what follows I use the normal distribution as a reference, but the results hold true for (most)
symmetric distributions, e.g. a uniform distribution.
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that more people are engaged in cooperation and that the income distribution is more
dispersed.
Similarly, if only within-task cooperation prevails in equilibrium, the change in sorting
and earnings depends on whether the demand for unfinished projects increases or decreases
relative to its supply. Yet, the fact that the price r(t) depends on talent implies that the
supply and demand at any point of the talent distribution matter. This often impedes
clear-cut results. More specifically, if
∫ x
0 (1 − s)h(s)ds <
∫ c(x)
c(0) 2h(s)ds for all x ∈ AAc ,
the relative supply of unfinished projects decreases at any point in AAc . In response,
r(t) increases for all agents in AAc and the returns to skill decrease.40 With a normal
distribution, the relative demand for unfinished projects increases at all points. This
implies that an increase in the variance of the “effective” talent distribution leads to a
reduction in returns to talent.
When both modes of cooperation occur in equilibrium, two things change. On the
one hand, changes in the demand for workers (unfinished projects) also influence the
equilibrium prices for unfinished projects (workers) as the outside options of occupations
change. On the other hand, the set of entrepreneurs is no longer the highest set, i.e.
the set with the most talented agents. As the set of workers remains the bottom set,
this implies that H(xWAc )H(xEC)−H(xAE) > 1 and therefore the wage w falls and earnings of
entrepreneurs rise for the more dispersed normal distribution. Similarly, the set AAc is
no longer the bottom set. Therefore,
∫ x
0 (1− s)h(s)ds <
∫ c(x)
c(0) 2h(s)ds for most x ∈ AAc
and the earnings of consultants decrease whilst those of agents selling unfinished projects
increase.
These results can be seen in figure 2.6. Comparing the dashed line which represents
an economy with a normal distribution with equal mean but higher variance than the
one represented by the solid line, I find that both the top and bottom set (AW and AC)
40The reverse applies if
∫ x
0 (1− s)h(s)ds >
∫ c(x)
c(0) 2h(s)ds for all x ∈ AAc . In this case, r(t) decreases
for all t ∈ AAc . However, often ∃x ∈ AAc :
∫ x
0 (1 − s)h(s)ds >
∫ c(x)
c(0) 2h(s)ds and ∃x ∈ AAc :∫ x
0 (1 − s)h(s)ds <
∫ c(x)
c(0) 2h(s)ds. In this case, analytical results cannot be derived and often some
consultants gain whilst others loose under the distribution H(x).
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Figure 2.6: Change in variance for a normal talent distribution
loose due to the increase in variance. On the contrary, both occupational sets AAc and
AE gain.
Right-skewed Talent Distribution. If the talent distribution is right-skewed (e.g.
log-normal or Pareto distribution) the general logic regarding the consequences of an
increase in variance still applies, yet the results differ, when there is a change in the
“effective” talent distribution from G(x) to H(x) that leaves the mean unaffected but
increases the variance.
In particular, if only between-task cooperation prevails in equilibrium, an increase in
variance holding the mean constant implies that the supply of workers becomes more
abundant, i.e. H(xWA) > 1−H(xAE). Therefore, the equilibrium wage w decreases and
returns to talent increase.
If only within-task cooperation occurs, it is no longer necessarily true that an increase
in the variance of the effective talent distribution leads to a decrease in the returns
to talent as with the normal talent distribution. By contrast, for high levels of cp,
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Figure 2.7: Change in variance for a log-normal talent distribution
i.e. rather small sets of both AC and AAc , an increase in the variance is likely to
make all agents in AAc worse off and all consultants better off. The reason is that in
that case,
∫ x
0 (1 − s)h(s)ds >
∫ c(x)
c(0) 2h(s)ds for all x ∈ AAc . For lower levels of cp it is
likely that some agents gain and others loose within both the sets AAc and AC . While∫ xAcA
0 (1− s)h(s)ds < 2(1−H(xAC)),
∫ x
0 (1− s)h(s)ds >
∫ c(x)
c(0) 2h(s)ds for some x ∈ AAc .
If both modes of cooperation occur, workers always loose and entrepreneurs always
gain due to the increase in variance. Furthermore, consultants may also gain if the
talent distribution is sufficiently skewed. The latter part did not occur when the talent
distribution was symmetric. Yet, as mentioned above, this depends on the particular
parameters of the economy, and some consultants may gain while others loose. Note that
the reduction in workers’ earnings is more pronounced the more skewed the distribution
of the probability of success.
Figure 2.7 shows these changes in earnings due to an increase in variance for a
log-normal distribution. The dashed line represents the distribution with equal mean but
higher variance than the solid line. In this case, entrepreneurs and most consultants gain
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while workers and autarkic agents engaged in within-task cooperation loose. The drop in
equilibrium wage w is substantial and the skill premium is higher in the more dispersed
economy.
To sum up, where both types of cooperation occur, a more dispersed talent distribu-
tion implies larger returns to talent for most skewed distributions, whereas for normal
distribution, both the least talented and the most talented loose. Thus, an economy such
as the U.S. with a more dispersed talent distribution compared to continental Europe
displays a larger variance in earnings both due to the higher returns to talent and the
more dispersed inherent talent distribution.
2.8 Conclusion
To conclude, I have developed a heterogeneous agents model of cooperation, where agents
can choose between two modes of cooperation: between-task and within-task cooperation.
In the former different tasks can be assigned to different agents before production begins.
In the latter tasks can be reassigned to (more skilled) agents when an agent fails to
complete the task. I characterize the equilibrium, and show the equilibrium properties
when it comes to matching between agents and sorting of agents into types of cooperation.
I then discuss the effects of cooperation on earnings inequality and the consequences
of an increase of cooperation over time on inequality. I find that in general cooperation
favors low-skilled and high-skilled agents at the expense of the medium-skilled. The effects
of a decrease in cooperation costs differ depending on which form of cooperation benefits
most: while reductions in between-task cooperation costs reduce inequality among both
the low-skilled agents and the high-skilled agents, the reverse holds true for reductions
in within-task cooperation costs. The paper highlights the importance of a detailed
analysis on which form of cooperation benefit most from some labor-market policies
as the consequences for inequality are critically dependent on whether between-task or
within-task cooperation costs decrease.
Finally, I analyzed whether cooperation can help explain the observable cross-country
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differences in skill premia. In particular, I find that a more dispersed talent distribution
is likely to imply a higher skill premium if the distribution is skewed. This also shows
the importance of higher moments in explaining cross-country differences in earnings.
The more skewed the distribution, the larger the skill premium.
I also show that a more dispersed talent distribution is equivalent to better information
on the task difficulty, i.e. less variance in the task difficulty distribution. Similarly, a
higher skew in the talent distribution is equivalent to a lower skew in the task difficulty
distribution. If over time the information on task difficulty is improved the skill premium
is expected to increase over time. Similarly, if over time tasks either become routine
and can be resolved by any agent with the help of machines and computers (task A), or
they become increasingly demanding and specific skills are required (i.e. the difficulty
of task B becomes more left-skewed), the “effective” skill distribution becomes more
right-skewed and the skill premium increases over time.
I have left some extensions of the model for future research. In particular, I would
like to extend the between-task cooperation by allowing for some uncertainty in task A
and an inclusion of multi-dimensional talent, which implies that the ranking between
agents can differ across tasks.
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2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that a worker i with talent t earns a
higher wage than another worker j with talent t′, i.e. w(t) > w(t′). Income maximization
implies that all entrepreneurs prefer to employ agent j and there is no demand for worker
i, thus contradicting labor market clearing.
As all workers earn the same wage w, they are indifferent regarding who they match
with. The same applies for entrepreneurs. Hence, the matching pattern is indeterminate.
Finally, each agent can remain autarkic and hence w ≥ pΨ(t) for all t ∈ AW .
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. First, consider the price r(t) for unfinished projects of an agent with talent t.
Suppose the price is positive and non-decreasing at some point t′, i.e. r(t′) ≤ r(t′ + ) for
some  > 0. Then, a strictly positive mass of consultants wants to contract the unfinished
projects of the agent with talent t′, and no agent wants to employ the agent with t+ ,
as the conditional success probability decreases in talent of the seller. This contradicts
task market clearing at all points t ∈ AAc(AEc) and, hence, the price function r(t) has to
decrease at all points t ∈ AAc(AEc).
Second, I turn to the proof of positive assortative matching. Consider two consultants
with talent t1 > t2, and two unfinished projects executed by two agents with t3 > t4. As
occupational stratification prevails (to be proven below in 2.9.1), t2 > t3.
Towards a contradiction, suppose that there is negative assortative matching, i.e. the
consultant with t1 (t2) buys the project of the agent with t4 (t3). Income maximization
of the consultants implies that
p
Ψ(t1)−Ψ(t4)
1−Ψ(t4) − p
Ψ(t1)−Ψ(t3)
1−Ψ(t3) ≥ r(t4)− r(t3),
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and
p
Ψ(t2)−Ψ(t4)
1−Ψ(t4) − p
Ψ(t2)−Ψ(t3)
1−Ψ(t3) ≤ r(t4)− r(t3).
Combining these two inequalities and manipulating the LHS leads to the following
necessary condition:
(1−Ψ(t1))(Ψ(t3)−Ψ(q ≤ t4))
(1−Ψ(t4))(1−Ψ(t3)) ≥
(1−Ψ(t2))(Ψ(t3)−Ψ(q ≤ t4))
(1−Ψ(t4))(1−Ψ(t3)) ,
which simplifies to the contradiction
Ψ(t2) ≥ Ψ(t1),
as t1 > t2.
In other words, the conditional success probability is supermodular in the talent of
the consultant and the agent selling the unfinished project,
∂2
(
Ψ(t)−Ψ(s)
1−Ψ(s)
)
∂ t ∂ s
= ψ(t)ψ(s)(1−Ψ(s))2 > 0,
and thus positive assortative matching prevails.
Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. Suppose earnings are not continuous at some point t′, i.e. lim→0 ω(t′ − ) 6=
lim→0 ω(t′ + ). W.l.o.g. suppose lim→0 ω(t′ − ) < lim→0 ω(t′ + ).
If both agents with talent ω(t′ − ) and ω(t′ + ) are in different occupations, the
agent with talent t′ −  can earn more if she switches occupations, thus contradicting
income maximization. In turn, if they are in the same occupation, the agent with talent
t′ −  can earn more contracting the cooperator of the agent with talent ω(t′ + ), again
contradicting income maximization. Hence, the earnings function is continuous.
Similarly, if it were non-increasing, the more talented agent can increase earnings by
switching to the occupation of the less talented agent and contracting her cooperator,
contradicting income maximizing behavior. Thus, earnings are monotonically and
continuously increasing in equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 2.3
I start to show the ordering between the (potential) occupational sets. Therefore I
compare the occupational sets pairwise according to their ordering. Transitivity ensures
the overall result. The arguments also hold if some of the sets are empty in equilibrium.
AW vs. AAc Workers earn a flat wage, hence
∂piW (t)
∂t = 0. The marginal earnings of
an autarkic agent engaged in within-task cooperation are
d piAc(t)
d t
= ψ(t)
(
p− r(t)− p 1−Ψ(cA(t))1−Ψ(t)
)
+ (1−Ψ(t)) ∂r(t)
∂cA(t)
∂cA(t)
∂t
from deriving (2.6) with respect to t. The last term is clearly positive, and the first term
is positive if
p
Ψ(cA(t))−Ψ(t)
1−Ψ(t) > r(t).
Towards a contradiction, suppose that
p
Ψ(cA(t))−Ψ(t)
1−Ψ(t) < r(t).
But, for the agent with talent cA(t) to choose to become a consultant, it is necessary that
p
Ψ(cA(t))−Ψ(t)
1−Ψ(t) − r(t) > cp.
Hence,
d piAc(t)
d t
> 0.
Towards a contradiction, suppose ∃t′ > t′′ : t′ ∈ AW ∧ t′′ ∈ AAc . Income maximization
implies that the agent with t′ earns more as a worker than in any other occupation. In
particular, piW (t′) = w > piAc(t′). But this directly contradicts the income maximization
of the agent with t′′ as d piAc (t)d t > 0, and hence piAc(t′) > piAc(t′′). Therefore, in equilibrium,
@t′ > t′′ : t′ ∈ AW ∧ t′′ ∈ AAc .
AAc vs. AA A comparison of the equations (2.6) and (2.7) implies that all autarkic
agents choose to engage in within-task cooperation as long as r(t) > 0. Proposition
2.2 states that r′(t) < 0 in equilibrium for all r(t) > 0. This directly implies that if
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for any agent piA(t) ≥ piAc(t), for any agent with t′ > t : piA(t′) > piAc(t′). Hence, in
equilibrium @t′ > t′′ : t′ ∈ AAc ∧ t′′ ∈ AA.
AAc vs. AEc The indifference condition between being an entrepreneur engaged in
within-task cooperation and an autarkic agent cooperating within-tasks is given by
pΨ(tAcEC ) + (1−Ψ(tAcEC )) r(tAcEC ) = w + ca.
As the LHS is strictly increasing in t, as shown above, all agents with t > tAcEC strictly
prefer to be an entrepreneur engaged in within-task cooperation than an autarkic agent
engaged in such cooperation. Hence, @t′ > t′′ : t′ ∈ AAc ∧ t′′ ∈ AEc .
AA vs. AE The marginal earnings of an autarkic agent are given by
pi′A(t) = pψ(t),
while those of an entrepreneur are equal to
pi′E(t) = 2 pψ(t).
The marginal earnings are greater for entrepreneurs than for autarkic agents for any t as
ψ(t) > 0. Towards a contradiction, suppose that ∃t′ > t′′ : t′ ∈ AA ∧ t′′ ∈ AE . Income
maximization implies that the agent with talent t′ optimizes her occupational choice.
In particular, piA(t′) > piE(t′). This, together with the fact that pi′E(t) > pi′A(t) for any
t leads directly to piA(t′′) > piE(t′′), contradicting the income maximizing occupational
choice of the agent with talent t′′. Thus, in equilibrium ∃t′ > t′′ : t′ ∈ AA ∧ t′′ ∈ AE .
AEC vs. AE The argument is analogous to the comparison between the occupational
sets AAc and AA. Entrepreneurs choose within-task cooperation as long as r(t) > 0.
As r′(t) < 0, if for any agent piE(t) ≥ piEc(t), i.e. r(t) ≤ 0, for all agents with t′ > t :
piE(t′) > piEc(t′). Hence, in equilibrium @t′ > t′′ : t′ ∈ AEc ∧ t′′ ∈ AE .
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AE vs. AC I compare the occupational sets of entrepreneurs and any type of consultant
(either of autarkic agents or entrepreneurs). The latter set is denoted AC .
The marginal earnings of an entrepreneur are given by
pi′E(t) = 2 pψ(t),
while those of a consultant are equal to
pi′C(t) = 2 p
ψ(t)
1−Ψ(c−1(t)) ,
by the envelope theorem. The function c−1(t) denotes the inverse of the assignment
function. As the denominator in the equation of consultants’ marginal earnings is
bounded above by 1, the marginal earnings of consultants are necessarily higher than
those of entrepreneurs for any t. Again, towards a contradiction, suppose ∃t′ > t′′ : t′ ∈
AE ∧ t′′ ∈ AC . Income maximization implies that piE(t′) > piC(t′), which together with
pi′C(t) > pi′E(t) directly implies piE(t′′) > piC(t′′), contradicting the income maximizing
choice of the agent with talent t′′. Hence, @t′ > t′′ : t′ ∈ AE ∧ t′′ ∈ AC in equilibrium.
ACA vs. ACE This result follows directly from the proposition 2.2. Positive assortative
matching prevails between consultants and the talent of agents selling unfinished projects.
Furthermore, I have shown that entrepreneurs are more talented than autarkic agents
engaged in within-task cooperation. Therefore, the consultants of entrepreneurs are
more talented than those of autarkic agents, i.e. @t′ > t′′ : t′ ∈ ACA ∧ t′′ ∈ ACE in
equilibrium.
This completes the proof of the ordering of occupational sets. Occupational stratifica-
tion follows directly by transitivity. I did not compare AA and AEC because these two
occupational sets are mutually exclusive.
To see this, suppose first that ∃t′ > t′′ : t′ ∈ AEc ∧ t′′ ∈ AA. Optimality of the
occupational choice of the agent with talent t′ implies that r(t′) > 0. But this implies
that r(t′′) > 0 as r′(t) < 0 for all t. This contradicts the optimality of occupational choice
of the agent with talent t′′. Hence, in equilibrium @t′ > t′′ : t′ ∈ AEc ∧ t′′ ∈ AA.
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Suppose that ∃t′ > t′′ : t′ ∈ AA ∧ t′′ ∈ AEc . The income maximizing occupational
choice of the agent with talent t′′ implies that piEc(t′′) > piAc(t′′), or equivalently
pΨ(t′′) + (1−Ψ(t′′)) r(t′′) ≥ w + ca.
Furthermore, I have shown above that the LHS of this equation strictly increases in
talent t. Hence, a fortiori
pΨ(t′) + (1−Ψ(t′)) r(t′) ≥ w + ca.
But this directly contradicts the optimality of the occupational choice for the agent with
talent t′ because in order to chose autarky over entrepreneurship it has to hold that
piA(t′) > piE(t′), or
pΨ(t′) ≤ w + ca.
Thus, I conclude that in equilibrium @t′ > t′′ : t′ ∈ AA ∧ t′′ ∈ AEc and thus one of the
two occupational sets AA and AEc has to be empty.
The fact that not all sets have to exist in equilibrium can be easily seen due to the
exogeneity of cooperation costs ca and cp. If both tend towards infinity, only autarkic
agents remain active in equilibrium. If the relative cost differences are too high, one form
of cooperation is dominated by the other.
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. The proof is divided into several parts. First I partition the parameter space into
subspaces in which only one equilibrium type can prevail as all other equilibrium types
contradict agents’ income-maximizing behavior. Then I demonstrate that an equilibrium
of this particular type always exists and is also unique.
I will now start to partition the parameter space:
1. As their is no disutility of work and all agents possess a non-negative success
probability in task B, all agents will choose to work. The next question is whether
any agent will enter either type of cooperation in equilibrium. The following two
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conditions preclude this. In particular, if the most talented agent prefers to remain
autarkic to engaging in any type of cooperation, then so will all the others.
Given that an entrepreneur has to pay the outside option of an agent to induce
her to join the cooperation, the respective conditions to prefer autarky over en-
trepreneurship reads as follows:
pΨ(t) < pΨ(t) + ca. (2.16)
The outside option of the least talented agent is pΨ(t). If the additional projects
sold (pΨ(t)) as an entrepreneur compared to an autarkic agent do not compensate
for the additional costs (pΨ(t)+ca), no agent will choose to become an entrepreneur.
Clearly, the gains increase in talent, while the costs remain constant. Therefore,
if the most talented agent prefers autarky over entrepreneurship, so will all the
others.
Similarly, for the most talented agent to prefer autarky over consulting it is sufficient
that
2 p Ψ(t)−Ψ(t)1−Ψ(t) − pΨ(t) < 2 cp. (2.17)
The LHS represents the additional projects sold on expectation when consulting
the least talented agents instead of remaining autarkic, and the RHS represents the
additional costs. Note that in this case the only costs are the fixed costs 2 cp, as
agents are willing to sell their unfinished projects at any positive price r(t). Here
too, the LHS increases in talent, i.e. the first agent to enter consulting is the most
talented agent.
If both conditions are met, then all occupational sets except of autarky must be
empty. The existence and uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium follows directly
from the fact that the success probability function Ψ(q) is well-defined.
2. Let us now consider the case where one of the two conditions, (2.16) or (2.17)
is met, and the other is not. This implies that necessarily one but only type of
cooperation occurs in equilibrium.
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(a) In particular, if (2.16) is satisfied and (2.17) is not, only within-task cooperation
takes place. Note that in this case, the condition for any agent with talent t
to prefer entrepreneurship over autarky reads as
pΨ(t) + (1−Ψ(t)) r(t) < pΨ(t) + (1−Ψ(t)) r(t) + ca. (2.18)
In the proof of proposition 2.3 I have demonstrated that the LHS increases in
t. Thus, the first agent to enter entrepreneurship is the most talented agent.
This combined with the fact that
(1−Ψ(t)) r(t)− (1−Ψ(t)) r(t) ≥ 0
implies that (2.16) is a sufficient condition for no agent to enter entrerpreneur-
ship.
Thus, the only feasible equilibrium types are AAc , AA, ACA and AAc , ACA .
What remains to be demonstrated is that one, and only one, of these two
equilibrium types exists and that the equilibrium is unique.
To do so, I fix a price r0 for the least talented agent, r(t), and use the
indifference conditions to calculate tAcA and tACA as
tACA = min{t,max{t,Ψ−1(
2(r0 + cp)(1−Ψ(t)) + 2pΨ(t)
p(1 + Ψ(t)) )}},
and
tAcA ≡ min{tACA , t : r0 =
∫ t
t
ψ(s)(1−Ψ(c(s)))
(1−Ψ(s))2 ds},
with c(s) = tACA +
∫ s
t
1−Ψ(s)
2
φ(s)
φ(c(s))ds.
41 Note that both tACA and tAcA are
continuously and monotonically increasing in r0 (strictly for r0 such that
t < tACA < t, which is fulfilled given that some agents want to become
consultants in equilibrium). As tACA strictly increases in r0, c(t) monotonically
41If tACA = tAcA the first indifference condition must be replaced by the relevant condition for tAcCA ,
pΨ(tAcCA) + (1−Ψ(tAcCA))r(tAcCA) = 2 p
Ψ(tAcCA)−Ψ(t)
1−Ψ(t) − 2 cp − 2 r0.
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increases for all t ∈ AAc and so does r′(t). Hence, r(t) monotonically increases
for all t ∈ AAc and thus tAcA as well. To conclude, both tACA and tAcA increase
continuously and monotonically in r0.
The excess supply function on the task market is defined as
ES(r0, tAcA, tACA) ≡
∫ tAcA
t
(1− Pr(s))φ(s)ds−
∫ t
t
ACA
2φ(s)ds.
As ES(r0, tAcA, tACA) continuously and monotonically increases both in tAcA
and tACA (strictly for t ≤ tAcA ≤ tACA < t), it strictly and monotonically
increases in r0.
Furthermore, note that
ES(0, tAcA, tACA) = −
∫ t
t
ACA
2φ(s)ds < 0,
and
ES(r∗∗0 , tAcA, tACA) =
∫ tAcA
t
(1− Pr(s))φ(s)ds > 0,
where r∗∗0 = {r0 : 2 p Ψ(t)−Ψ(t)1−Ψ(t) − 2 r0 − 2 cp = pΨ(t)}. Hence, by the Mean
Value Theorem, r∗0 exists, where r∗0 is such that
ES(r∗0, tAcA, tACA) = 0,
and it is also unique given that ES(r0, tAcA, tACA) is strictly monotonically
increasing in the range of r0 indicated by the algorithm.
(b) On the contrary, if (2.17) is satisfied and (2.16) is not, only between-task
cooperation prevails in equilibrium. In this case, as long as ca > 0, the
equilibrium consists of the occupational sets {AW , AA, AE} with the wage
w > 0 determined by the labor market clearing condition. For any positive
cooperation costs some agents will remain autarkic. I still need to demonstrate
that an equilibrium of type {AW , AA, AE} always exists and is unique.
Fixing a flat wage w ≥ 0 and thresholds tWA < tAE allows me to calculate
the earnings of all agents using equations (2.7) and (2.9). In this case the
equilibrium conditions (2.4) and (2.11) are not necessarily satisfied.
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I will now construct an equilibrium that also satisfies these conditions. First,
I fix w and calculate tWA and tAE as
tWA = Ψ−1(
w
p
)
and
tAE = Ψ−1(
w + ca
p
),
using both indifference conditions. The excess labor supply is defined as
ES(w, t∗WA, t∗AE) ≡
∫ t∗WA
t
φ(s)ds−
∫ t
t∗AE
φ(s)ds,
with t∗WA = min{t,max{t, tWA}} and t∗AE = min{t,max{t, tAE}}. Note that
both tWA and tAE continuously and monotonically increase in w as Ψ is a
strictly and monotonically increasing function. Therefore, the labor demand
(supply) weakly decreases (increases) in w (strictly if tAE ∈ [t, t] and tWA ∈
[t, t], respectively). Thus in order to show both existence and uniqueness it is
sufficient to show that the excess labor supply is negative (positive) for a low
(high) wage w. Note that
ES(0, t∗WA, t∗AE) = −
∫ t
Ψ−1( ca
p
)
φ(s)ds < 0,
which is negative as Ψ−1( cap ) < t due to the equilibrium type fixed by the
algorithm. Moreover,
ES(pΨ(t)− ca, t∗WA, t∗AE) =
∫ Ψ−1( pΨ(t)−ca
p
)
t
φ(s)ds > 0,
as Ψ−1(pΨ(t)−cap ) > t by the algorithm. Therefore, I can conclude that the
equilibrium exists by the Mean Value Theorem, and that it is also single-valued
as the excess labor supply continuously and strictly monotonically increases
for any w such that the equilibrium type determined by the algorithm is
{W,A,E}.
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3. Finally, consider the case that both conditions, (2.16) and (2.17), are not met. This
does not necessarily imply that all occupational sets are active. To determine which
mode(s) of cooperation prevail in equilibrium, I proceed as follows:
(a) First, I construct the {AW , AA, AE} candidate equilibrium from above as I
determine the market clearing wage w and earnings in case only between-task
cooperation would prevail. This is the unique equilibrium if and only if the
most talented agent does not prefer to become a consultant, i.e. iff
2 p Ψ(t)−Ψ(tWA)1−Ψ(tWA) − 2 cp < 2 pΨ(t)− w − ca, (2.19)
where tWA is the cut-off agent who is indifferent between the occupational
sets AW and AA as calculated for the {AW , AA, AE} candidate equilibrium,
and is the agent who constitutes the best match if t becomes a consultant.
Furthermore, w denotes the labor market clearing wage for that equilibrium.
If (2.19) is satisfied, the equilibrium is the same as if (2.17) were satisfied and
existence and uniqueness is guaranteed.
(b) If (2.19) is not satisfied, I construct the {AAc , (AA), ACA} candidate equilib-
rium from above when condition (2.16) was fulfilled, but (2.17) not. No agent
wants to engage in between-task cooperation if the least talented consultant
(denoted tCA) does not prefer to become an entrepreneur, i.e. if
2 pΨ(tCA)− ω(t)− ca < 2 p
Ψ(tCA)−Ψ(t)
1−Ψ(t) − 2 r0 − 2 cp, (2.20)
The least talented consultant is the first one who prefers to become an en-
trepreneur. In this case she would employ the least talented agent, and pay
her the outside option ω(t). Note that r0 is the task market clearing price from
above. If the agent with talent tCA does not prefer to become an entrepreneur,
no agent will and the equilibrium is the same as if (2.16) were satisfied and
existence and uniqueness is guaranteed.
(c) Lastly, if both (2.19) and (2.20) are not satisfied both types of cooperation
prevail in equilibrium.
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The existence and uniqueness proof when both types of cooperation are present
is a combination of the two cases above. First, fix some w. Then, fix some
r0 and calculate tWAc , tAcA, and tECA similar to above using the relevant
indifference conditions. The excess supply function on the task market now
reads as
ES(r0, w, tWAc , tAcA, tECA) ≡
∫ tAcA
tWAc
(1− Pr(s))φ(s)ds−
∫ t
t
ECA
2φ(s)ds.
It is straightforward to verify that for low (high) levels of r0 there is excess
demand (supply). Note that tECA strictly and monotonically increases in r0.
Therefore, r′(t) increases strictly and monotonically for all t ∈ AAc . As the
cdf Φ(t) is continuously and monotonically increasing, this implies that r(t)
increases for all t ∈ AAc and in particular for r(tAcA). Hence, the excess
supply function increases continuously and monotonically in r0. Thus, there
exists a unique r∗0(w, tWAc , tAcA, tACA) that clears the task market.
Clearly, this does not imply that the labor market clears alongside the task
market. Therefore, I now need to demonstrate that r∗0(w, tWAc , t∗AcA, tACA)
changes continuously and monotonically in w, and there is excess labor demand
for low levels of w and excess labor supply for high levels of w. The former fol-
lows from the fact that any increase in w causes tECA to decrease continuously
and monotonically and tWAc to increase continuously and monotonically. Thus
any agent with t ∈ AAc is matched with a less skilled consultant, and thus
r′(t) decreases. Hence, the excess supply function unambiguously decreases
and thus the task market clearing r∗0(w, tWAc , t∗AcA, tACA) has to increase con-
tinuously and monotonically. The latter follows straightforward from the fact
that for w = 0, there is excess labor demand and for w = pΨ(t)− ca, there
is excess labor supply (given that in equilibrium both modes of cooperation
prevail).
I conclude that there is always a unique equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 2.6
Proof. As the median agent is presumed to remain autarkic, her earnings are not affected
by any change in cooperation costs whereas any agent who takes part in cooperation
enjoys an increase in earnings if cooperation costs fall. As both the 10%-percentile and
90%-percentile of the talent distribution are engaged in cooperation, the first two parts
of the proposition follow immediately.
The marginal earnings of agents in the sets AW , AA, and AC depend exclusively on
the agent’s talent. Therefore, changes in cooperation costs do not affect their marginal
earnings. By contrast, the marginal earnings of agents in AC and AAc depend on the
talent of the match. If cooperation costs cp fall, all agents in AAc are matched with a less
skilled consultant (recall that both occupations form convex sets at the bottom and top
of the talent distribution). Therefore, dr
′(t)
dcp
< 0 for all t, as less talented consultants have
a lower marginal willingness to pay for unfinished projects (bear in mind that r′(t) < 0).
Thus, a reduction in cooperation costs causes the equilibrium price function r(t) to
become flatter and the inequality within the set AAc to decrease.
In other words, the least talented agent in AAc profits most from the reduction in cp
whereas among consultants the reverse applies. From the envelope theorem it is clear that
the marginal earnings of a consultant are pi′C(t) = 2 p
ψ(t)
1−Ψ(c−1(t)) . As the match improves
for all agents in AC , so do marginal earnings. Hence, the most talented agent in AC will
benefit most from a reduction in cp and inequality within the set of consultants increases.
I conclude, that a reduction in within-task cooperation costs reduces the within-group
inequality in the set AAc and increases it in AC .
2.9.2 Reductions in Cooperation Costs
Here I provide the derivation of the comparative statics results on cooperation costs,
both for between-task cooperation and within-task cooperation, and discuss briefly the
consequences for the inequality between the 90%-percentile and 10%-percentile. I analyze
the cases that only between-task and within-task cooperation are present in equilibrium.
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Between-task Cooperation Recall that the equilibrium is defined by the labor
market clearing condition (2.11) and two indifference conditions for tWA and tAE if only
between-task cooperation prevails in equilibrium. The equilibrium conditions read as
follows:
pΨ(tAE)− w − ca = 0
pΨ(tWA)− w = 0
1− Φ(tAE)− Φ(tWA) = 0
The total differentials of the first condition (after plugging in the second one) and the
third condition read as
d tWA
d tAE
= ψ(tAE)
ψ(tWA)
− 1
pψ(tWA)
d ca
d tAE
,
d tWA
d tAE
=− φ(tAE)
φ(tWA)
,
which combined deliver
d tAE
d ca
= φ(tWA)
pψ(tAE)φ(tWA) + pψ(tWA)φ(tAE)
,
and
d tWA
d ca
= −φ(tAE)
pψ(tAE)φ(tWA) + pψ(tWA)φ(tAE)
.
Similarly, the change in equilibrium wage is given by
dw
d ca
= −ψ(tWA)φ(tAE)
ψ(tAE)φ(tWA) + ψ(tWA)φ(tAE)
= − 11 + ξ(tWA, tAE) ,
where ξ(tWA, tAE) =
φ(tWA)
ψ(tWA)
φ(tAE)
ψ(tAE)
. The set of agents who choose to become entrepreneurs
decreases in the cooperation cost ca. Consequently, so does the set of workers due to
labor market clearing. The indifference condition for the agent separating workers from
autarkic agents implies that the wage w has to decrease in ca as well.
Whether the inequality between entrepreneurs and workers increases or decreases
hinges exclusively on the distribution of success probability. Recall that ξ(tWA, tAE) =
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g(xWA)
g(xAE) , the ratio of the marginal distributions of “effective” talent at tWA and tAE . Any
change in the talent or task difficulty distribution, that increases this ratio, implies
that a larger share of the gains from less costly cooperation accrues to entrepreneurs.
For example, if the probability of success is characterized by a normal distribution,
ξ(tWA, tAE) = 1, and the gains from less expensive cooperation are shared equally among
workers and entrepreneurs. By contrast, if the “effective” talent distribution is a Pareto,
greater part of the gains obtained from less costly cooperation goes to entrepreneurs. In
this case, the entrepreneurs’ share is largest for high levels of ca. If the set of autarkic
agents goes to 0, then the share of cost reduction that goes to workers in terms of a wage
increase tends towards 0.5, independent of the talent distribution. In general, the more
skewed the distribution, the larger the share of cost reductions for entrepreneurs.
Within-task Cooperation In cases where only within-task cooperation occurs in
equilibrium, the equilibrium conditions read as follows if some agents remain autarkic:
p
Ψ(tACA)(1 + Ψ(t))− 2Ψ(t)
1−Ψ(t) − 2 r0− 2 cp =0
r0 − p
∫ tAcA
t
ψ(s)(1−Ψ(c(s)))
(1−Ψ(s))2 ds =0∫ t
t
(1−Ψ(s))φ(s)ds−
∫ c(t)
c(t)
2φ(c(s))ds =0 ∀t ∈ AAc
The total differentials of the first condition (after plugging in the second one) and the
third condition read as
d tAcA
d tACA
=
p(1+Ψ(t))ψ(t
ACA
)
1−Ψ(t) + 2p
∫ tAcA
t
1
1+
∫ s
t
φ′(c(u)) 1−Ψ(u)2
φ(u)
(φ(c(u)))2 du
ψ(s)ψ(c(s))
(1−Ψ(s))2 ds
2pψ(tAcA)(1−Ψ(t))(1−Ψ(tAcA))2
−
− 2
2pψ(tAcA)(1−Ψ(t))(1−Ψ(tAcA))2
dcp
dtACA
,
d tAcA
d tACA
=− 2φ(tACA)(1−Ψ(tAcA))φ(tAcA)
,
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Combining these two equation implies
dcp
dtACA
= pψ(tAcA)(1−Ψ(t))(1−Ψ(tAcA))2
2φ(tACA)
(1−Ψ(tAcA))φ(tAcA)
+ p(1 + Ψ(t))ψ(tACA)2(1−Ψ(t)) +
+p
∫ tAcA
t
1
1 +
∫ s
t φ
′(c(u))1−Ψ(u)2
φ(u)
(φ(c(u)))2du
ψ(s)ψ(c(s))
(1−Ψ(s))2 ds.
As this derivative is positive, it follows directly from the task market clearing condition
that dtAcAdcp < 0 and
dr0
dcp
< 0. In the case of within-task cooperation, however, not only
the marginal distribution at the occupational cut-off levels, but the entire distribution
affects how cost reductions are shared between cooperating agents. However, it still
holds that the share that accrues to consultants increases with the skewness of the talent
distribution.
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